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THE PHILOSOPHY AND DESIGN OF
CONTEMPORARY CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEMS: A CANADA-
UNITED STATES COMPARISON©
BY JACOB S. ZIEGEL*
The rapid increase in the number of consumer
bankruptcies in Canada and the United States over the
past fifteen years has again focused attention on the
philosophy and design of modern insolvency systems,
and on the similarities and differences in the
approaches adopted in Canada and the United States.
In this article, the author points out that the single most
important difference is that the United States has
historically subscribed to the debtor's right to a "fresh
start" after surrendering the debtor's non-exempt
property, whereas Canadian law never has, and does
not now, confer an absolute right of discharge.
Although critical of many aspects of the recent
amendments to the Canadian Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act (BLt), the author concludes that the
qualified fresh-start policy followed by Canadian law is
conceptually sound. At the same time, he indicates his
preference for the more flexible, judicially-supervised
surplus income regime in force before 1997, in place of
the mandatory, surplus-income payment requirements
introduced in the 1997 amendments to the niA.
Laugmentation rapide dans le nombre de faillites des
consommateurs au Canada et aux Etats-Unis pendant
les quinze demi.res ann es, a une fois de plus attire
l'attention sur la philosophie et la conception de
systbmes de faillite modernes, et sur les similaritds et
les diff6rences entre les approches adopt~es au Canada
et aux Etats-Unis. Dans cet article, 'auteur indique que
]a plus importante diff6rence unique, c'est que les
Etats-Unis ont historiquement souscrits au droit du
d~biteur pour un <,nouveau depart>, apr~s avoir rendu
la proprit6 non-exempt.e du d6biteur, tandis que la
loi canadienne n'a jamais, et jusqu'. jour, confr6 le
droit absolu . un acquittement. Bien qu'il critique
plusieurs aspects des amendements de )a Loi sur la
faillite et l'insolvabilitd du Canada, 'auteur conclut que
la politique du <nouveau d6part>> conditionnel suivie
par la loi canadienne est conceptuellementjudicieuse.
En mkme temps, il indique sa prference pour le
r6gime du surplus de revenus, plus flexible et
judiciairement surveill, enforc6 avant 1997, au lieu des
exigences obligatoires de remboursement du surplus-
revenus, introduites dans les amendements de la Loi
sur la faillite et l'insolvabilitd en 1997.
© 1999, J.S. Ziegel.
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I. INTRODUCTION
These are anxious times for bankruptcy policymakers, though
history teaches us that turbulence has been the hallmark of bankruptcy
law during much of its evolution, at least in common law jurisdictions.
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, controversy swirled around
the content and structure of bankruptcy legislation, the role of voluntary
and involuntary bankruptcies, whether debtors should be allowed a
statutory discharge from their liabilities and, in the case of Canada and
the United States, the roles the federal governments should be playing in
this branch of commercial law.
The current controversies differ because their primary focus is
consumer bankruptcies. They have been triggered in Canada and the
United States, and to a lesser extent in other common law jurisdictions,
by the rapid rise in the number of consumer bankruptcies over the past
ten years or more.1 Critics on both sides of the border, notably the
1 Between 1985 and 1997, Canadian consumer insolvencies grew more than fourfold from
19,752 in 1985 to 90,034 in 1997. The comparable figures for the United States were 341,233 and
1,350,118, also a fourfold increase. By way of comparison, individual insolvencies in England and
Wales were 6,778 in 1985 and 24,420 in 1997, also an increase of just under 400 per cent. However,
the insolvency rate per 1,000 persons in England and Wales was only 0.47 in 1997 compared to 3.00
in Canada and 5.1 for the United States. The number of consumer insolvencies in Australia
amounted to 8,761 in 1986-1987 and 22,285 in 1996-1997, also a very substantial increase. The
insolvency rate for Australia in 1996-1997 was 1.20, nearly three times the rate for England and
Wales. All of these statistics are taken from T. Craddock, "International Consumer Insolvency
Statistics" (Conference on the Contemporary Challenges of Consumer Bankruptcies in a
Comparative Context, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 21-22 August 1998) [unpublished].
Those depressed by these numbers and the rapid escalation of the consumer bankruptcy rates
in Canada and the United States may derive some comfort from Peter Coleman's account of the
incidence of debt problems in the early history of the United States: see P.J. Coleman, Debtors and
Creditors in America: Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt, and Bankruptcy, 1607-1900 (Madison, Wis.:
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1974) at 287-88, where he writes that,
[t]he crude and imperfect evidence of the late eighteenth century suggests that as many as
one householder in three may each year have been hauled into court as a defaulting
debtor, and that by the early nineteenth century one householder in every five would,
during his working lifetime, fail outright rather than merely default on a particular debt.
The incidence of difficulty probably rose as the century advanced. For example, three
Philadelphians in every eight spent some time in a debtors' prison in the late 1820's, and
the equivalent of one householder in each one hundred applied for a discharge under the
short-lived national bankruptcy law of 1841. Nearly thirty-four thousand persons
petitioned under the act and almost $400,000,000 in debts were written down, an average
of more than $11,000 a case.
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consumer credit industry, complain that it is too easy for consumers to
go bankrupt and obtain a discharge, and that this leads to great abuses.
In the United States these complaints, as well as other factors,
led to the establishment of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
(NBRC) in 1995 and subsequently to the introduction of congressional
bills2 which, had they been adopted, would have resulted in the adoption
of a means test for bankruptcy petitioners. In Canada, the formal thrust
of the 1997 amendments to the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act
(BIA) 3 is not to deny petitioners access to the bankruptcy door. Instead,
the goal is to encourage consumers to opt for the proposal route under
Part III, Division 2 of the Act through the adoption of mandatory
income payment requirements and cognate provisions. The means may
be different, but the message is the same in both countries: consumer
debtors with surplus income must be prepared to pay off at least part of
their debts or stay clear of straight bankruptcy altogether.
These recent developments warrant an article in their own right.
However, since they are only part of a much broader series of questions
concerning the role and philosophy of modern consumer bankruptcy
systems, I will address them in that context.
A preliminary issue much debated in the nineteenth
century-should consumers be allowed to go bankrupt and obtain
absolution from their debts?-was resolved in the United States with the
passage of national bankruptcy legislation in 1898,4 and in Canada with
the adoption of the Bankruptcy Act 5 of 1919. As I will explain presently,
unlike in the United States, the unconditional entitlement to a fresh start
has never been part of Canadian law. It is still not the law, although in
most cases (perhaps as high as 90 per cent) consumers obtain an
unconditional discharge. What may be fairly claimed is that modern
2 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998); and Consumer
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1997). See also J. Braucher, "Options in
Consumer Bankruptcies: An American Perspective" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 155. The two bills
expired with the adjournment of Congress for the mid-term elections in November 1998. However,
new bills have been introduced in the 106th Congress incorporating similar means-testing
provisions, and I have been advised that one of the bills is likely to receive congressional approval:
see in particular Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999); and Banknptcy
Reform Act of 1999, S. 625,106th Cong. (1999).
3 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 [hereinafter EtA], as am. byAn Act to amend the Bankruptcy Act and to
amend the Income Tax Act in consequence thereof, S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 2 [hereinafter 1992
Amendments].
4 See An Act To establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States, c. 541, 30
Stat. 544 (1898) [hereinafter National Bankruptcy Act of 1898].
5 1919 (Can.), 9 & 10 Geo. V, c. 36 [hereinafter 1919Act].
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common law jurisdictions share the common philosophy that the "honest
but unfortunate debtor" should be able to make a fresh start. Where
they differ is in determining when that point has been reached.
The availability of bankruptcy relief for consumers in common-
law systems is in striking contrast to the position in many civil law
countries, where bankruptcy is either a non-existent option or only
available after all other avenues of relief have been exhausted. In those
countries, the stigma of bankruptcy and repugnance of any official
philosophy encouraging dispensation from consumer debts is still very
strong.6
These alternative civil law approaches to the management of
consumer debt in an era of bountiful consumer credit raise challenging
questions about lifestyles and legislative approaches. How successful are
the civilian approaches, and is their success contingent on maintaining a
firm lid on the consumption of consumer credit? Of what use is a more
or less mandatory income payment program, coupled with intensive
counselling, for debtors who have no surplus income, but nevertheless
have managed to run up sizeable debts? How true is it to say that a
strong social safety net dispenses with the need for a fresh start policy, or
is this only a debate over the right kind of packaging and acceptable
nomenclature?
These questions are addressed to some extent in other articles in
this Symposium. I will turn now to my basic theme. This is the
philosophy and design of consumer bankruptcy systems in common law
jurisdictions that proceed from the premise that no distinction should be
drawn between business and non-business debtors in their ability to
obtain relief from the burden of debt.
II. CANADIAN AND AMERICAN SYSTEMS
AS A BASIS OF COMPARISON
My comparison will be between the Canadian and American
systems. I have chosen the Canadian system because I know it best and
because it serves as a proxy for the British system from which it is
derived. There are still more important reasons for comparing the
Canadian and American experiences and approaches. Although the
6 See J. Niemi-Kiesiliinen, "Changing Directions in Consumer Bankruptcy Law and Practice
in Europe and USA" (1997) 20 J. Consumer Pol'y 133; and J. Niemi-Kiesiliinen, "Consumer
Bankruptcy in Comparison: Do We Cure a Market Failure or a Social Problem?" (1999) 37
Osgoode Hall L.J. 473 [hereinafter "Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison"].
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population of the United States is nine times greater than Canada's, our
lifestyles are similar in many respects. Both countries have federal
systems of government and private law rules based predominantly on
common law concepts. Both have market-driven economies. Both are
very heavy users of consumer credit. Both have experienced an explosive
growth in the number of consumer bankruptcies over the past twenty-
five years. One difference between the two countries is that Canada has
a significantly stronger social safety net than the United
States-through, for example, the existence of a national medicare
system, programs of child support and support for single parents, paid
maternity leave for new mothers, and better benefits for unemployed
workers.
Another important difference is that the Canadian insolvency
system and its underlying philosophy have developed quite
independently of the American system. The critical questions for
consideration therefore are whether the Canadian system has struck a
better balance than has the American system between the legitimate and
non-legitimate uses of bankruptcy for the discharge of consumer debts,
and whether any apparent difference between the two systems is a
matter of detail, and only masks a deeper social and economic reality.
III. THE FAULT LINES OF COMPARISON
I believe the similarities and differences between the Canadian
and American systems can best be exposed in terms of the following
series of questions, which constitute the fault lines of many modern
bankruptcy systems:
1. How does the debtor enter the bankruptcy process and who
administers the debtor's bankruptcy?
2. How much of the debtor's property must the debtor surrender to
the bankruptcy estate? Does it include any part of the debtor's income
prior to the debtor's -discharge? What part of the debtor's property is
exempt from the trustee's reach, and how are secured claims treated?
3. When is the debtor entitled to apply for a discharge or is
discharge automatic at some point? May the court refuse a discharge or
impose conditions for a discharge? In particular, may the court require
payment of some or all of the outstanding debts from the debtor's future
income? What types of claim are excluded from discharge?
4. What alternative statutory schemes are in place to enable or
encourage a debtor to avoid straight bankruptcy, and to enter into an
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arrangement or compromise of his or her debts ("plan" or "proposal")
with his or her creditors? What are the preconditions for a successful
plan or proposal? What are the consequences of the debtor's failure to
live up to the terms of the plan or proposal?
5. Does the regime permit reaffirmation of pre-bankruptcy debts?
6. What role does counselling play as part of the debtor's
rehabilitation, whether in a straight bankruptcy or as part of a plan or
proposal?
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
A. Constitutional and HistoricalAspects
In order to make my answers to these questions intelligible to an
American reader, I must begin with some background strokes about the
Canadian insolvency system. In Canada, as in the United States, the
federal government is constitutionally empowered to adopt bankruptcy
and insolvency legislation.7 The difference between the two countries is
that, in Canada's case, the federal government is, on paper at least,
invested with an exclusive jurisdiction to legislate on questions of
bankruptcy and insolvency. In practice, Canadian courts have tolerated,
though not consistently, a substantial amount of overlap between federal
and provincial law as long as the provincial law is not in direct conflict
with federal law. In any event, the federal bankruptcy system is premised
on a largely provincially-originating substratum of property and other
pre-bankruptcy rules,8 so that provincial law exerts a powerful influence
on the resolution of bankruptcy disputes.
Canada's first insolvency Act, which only applied to traders, was
adopted in 18699 and was replaced by a later Act in 1875.10 The 1875 Act
7 See Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 92(13), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
App. II, No. 5 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1867]. See also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, which provides
that "Congress shall have power ... [t]o establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States ...."
8 See ilA, supra note 3, s. 72(1), which provides that "the provisions of this Act shall not be
deemed to abrogate or supersede the substantive provisions of any other law or statute relating to
property and civil rights that are not in conflict with the Act .... "
9 See The Insolvent Act of 1869 (Can.), 32-33 Vict., c. 16 [hereinafter 1869Act].
10 See The Insolvent Act of 1875 (Can.), 38 Vict., c. 16 [hereinafter 1875Act].
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was widely criticized, and it was repealed in 1880.11 Between 1880 and
1919, Canada had no general bankruptcy legislation at all. However, in
1882 the federal government adopted winding up legislation for
insolvent trading corporations and other corporate enterprises.) 2
The first comprehensive Canadian bankruptcy legislation was
adopted in 1919. The 1919 Actl3 was heavily influenced by the British
Bankruptcy Act, 188314 and its general conceptual structure. The 1919
Act differed from the British Act in two important respects. First, it did
not follow the British precedent of relegating corporate insolvencies to a
separate legislative regime; for the most part, the 1919 Act applied the
same rules to natural and legal persons. Second, the 1919 Act adopted a
different structure for the administration of insolvent estates and their
supervision that, in Canada's case, was strongly privately oriented.15
The British influence on subsequent Canadian legislation has
been very limited. I have already mentioned the substantial
independence of Canadian insolvency legislation from American
influences. Since 1919, Canada has generally preferred to cultivate a
home-grown product.
The 1919 Act was extensively revised in 1949.16 Comprehensive
proposals for new revisions were presented by a federal Study
Committee in 1970.17 However, these were never translated into
legislation despite the introduction of several bills between 1975 and
1984. Beginning with the Mulroney Conservative administration, later
governments opted for a phased-in program of bankruptcy reform.18
Two important amending acts have so far seen the light of day, the first
11 SeeAn Act to repeal the Acts Respecting Insolvency now in force in Canada, 1880 (Can.), 43
Vict., c. 1.
12 See An Act respecting Insolvent Banks, Insurance Companies, Loan Companies, Building
Societies and Trading Corporations, 1882 (Can.), 45 Vict., c. 23.
13 Supra note 5.
14 (U.K.), 46 & 47 Viet., c. 52 [hereinafter 1883 Act].
15 See further T.G.W. Telfer, "The Canadian Bankruptcy Act of 1919: Public Legislation or
Private Interest?" (1994) 24 Can. Bus. LJ. 357.
16 See Bankruptcy Act, 1949 (Can.), 13 Geo. VI, c. 7 [hereinafter 1949Act].
17 See Canada, Bankruptcy and Insolvency: Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Legislation (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970) (Chair: R. Tass6). John Honsberger,
Q.C., Canada's leading bankruptcy scholar, was a key member of the Committee.
18 See J.S. Ziegel, "Canada's Phased-in Bankruptcy Law Reform" (1996) 70 Am. Bankr. L.J.
383 [hereinafter "Bankruptcy Law Reform"].
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in 1992,19 and the second in 1997.20 A third round of amendments is
envisaged for adoption early in the twenty-first century.
B. The 1992 and 1997Amendments
So far as the topic of this article is concerned, the 1992
amendments were important because they greatly simplified the
procedure for the handling of discharges for personal bankrupts, and
because they introduced a separate regime for the making of consumer
proposals as an alternative to straight bankruptcy. The 1997
amendments added another very significant chapter to the treatment of
consumer bankruptcies; section 68 of the BiA was completely re-written
to require debtors, between the time of bankruptcy and the time of their
discharge, to pay over their surplus income based on standards issued by
the Superintendent of Bankruptcy ("Superintendent"). 21
New provisions were also added to the BIA dealing with the
debtor's application for a discharge. Section 170.1 of the BIA requires the
trustee's report to the court hearing the discharge application to report
whether the debtor has complied with the section 68 income payment
requirements, 22 and whether the debtor chose the bankruptcy route for
resolving his or her indebtedness when the debtor could have made a
viable proposal. 23  The trustee's report may also include
recommendations with respect to whether the debtor's discharge should
be made conditional 2 4 If such a recommendation is made, it will be
treated as an opposition to the discharge. Another amendment, this one
to section 173,25 adds to the list of circumstances precluding the court
from granting the debtor an unconditional discharge if the debtor has
failed to comply with a section 68 income payment requirement, or if the
19 See 1992 Amendments, supra note 3.
20 See An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act and the Income TaxAct, S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 2 [hereinafter 1997Amendments].
21 See Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Directive No. 11: Surplus Income (issued 30
April 1998), online: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy <http:llstrategis.ic.gc.caISSGI
brOlO55e.html> (date accessed: 19 August 1999) [hereinafter Directive No. 11].
22 See BM, supra note 3, s. 170.1(2)(a).
23 Ibid. s. 170.1(2)(c).
2 4 Ibid. s. 170.1(3).
2 5 Ibid. ss. 173(m)-(n), as am. by 1997Amendments, supra note 20, s. 103(1).
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debtor chose the bankruptcy route when the debtor could have made a
viable proposal.
In short, Canadian consumer creditors and their allies won a
major victory in making sure that future bankrupts would not be able to
shrug off their debts as easily as their predecessors had allegedly done in
the past.
C. Administrative and Judicial Structures
In theory at any rate, Canadian bankruptcies are creditor driven,
and the judicial role is minimized. At the apex of the administrative
hierarchy sits the Superintendent, a federally appointed official, who
appoints or recommends the appointments of all trustees in
bankruptcy 26 and official receivers.2 7 Official receivers are full-time
federal officials located in the bankruptcy districts into which Canada is
divided. Their functions include receiving assignments in bankruptcy,
appointing a trustee if none is designated in the assignment, and
conducting inquiries into the causes of bankruptcies.28
In practice, the trustee, who is not a government official, is the
most important cog in the administrative wheel. The trustee is required
to be licensed by the Superintendent,2 9 and is usually a chartered
accountant specializing in insolvency law. Canadian trustees differ from
their American counterparts in two important respects. First, Canadian
trustees are drawn exclusively from the private sector and are not public
officials, although for some purposes they may be treated as officers of
the court. Second, most consumer bankruptcies are initiated and
processed by trustees without the intervention of an attorney. Canadian
debtors are free to retain an attorney to prepare the assignment, but few
consumers would find it efficient to do so since it would involve the
payment of two sets of fees-the attorney's and the trustee's. Canadian
trustees widely advertise their services on cable television and in the
Yellow Pages of the local telephone directory, and less frequently on
local television. 30 They frequently operate from more than one office
26 Ibid. ss. 5(3)(a), 13.
271Ibid. s. 12.
28 Ibid ss. 49(3)-(4), 161.
29 Ibid. s. 13. A substantial number of trustees are former official receivers.
30 Some large firms of trustees with many offices are estimated to spend $100,000 or more
annually on advertising. Other trustees spend very little and rely primarily on word of mouth
recommendations. Directive No. 30R, issued by the Office of the Superintendent in Bankruptcy,
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and rely heavily on non-professional staff to help them process large
numbers of consumer bankruptcies. 31 As a rule, the trustee is nominated
to serve in this capacity by the debtor in a voluntary assignment or by the
petitioning creditor in an involuntary bankruptcy. Although the
Canadian system might be perceived as giving rise to conflicts of interest,
so far neither the courts nor the Superintendent have raised objections
to it.
The trustee's appointment is required to be confirmed at the first
meeting of creditors, but this is usually only a formality. Once appointed,
the trustee is invested with legal title to all the assets of the estate,32 and
can sue and be sued in his or her capacity as trustee. Unlike American
law,33 the BIA does not conceptualize the debtor's estate as constituting a
separate legal persona.
The role of an inspector of the bankrupt's estate is comparable
to the role of a director of a business corporation. Inspectors are elected
by the estate's creditors. 34 They supervise the trustee's activities and are
required to give their approval to all important decisions made by the
trustee3S In practice, in straight bankruptcies, most unsecured creditors
take very little interest in the administration of the estate, since they
know that ordinarily very little will be left of the estate after the claims of
secured and preferred creditors have been satisfied.
36
Once the bankrupt's assets have been gathered in and realized, it
is the trustee's responsibility to distribute the net proceeds among the
creditors with proven claims in accordance with the priorities established
makes a modest attempt to regulate some aspects of trustees' advertising, though not the amount of
advertising or the media through which it may be carried: see Office of the Superintendent of
Bankruptcy, Directive No. 30R: Advertising by Trustees (issued 4 January 1991), online: Office of the
Superintendent of Bankruptcy <http:llstrategis.ic.gc.calpicslbr/dir3Or.pdf.> (date accessed: 19
August 1999). Note too that section 202(1)(f) of the BiA, supra note 3, makes it an offence for any
person directly or indirectly to solicit or canvass any person to make an assignment or a proposal
under the Act, or to petition for a receiving order. The provision may be vulnerable to attack as an
unconstitutional infringement on freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
31 In a large population centre, such as Toronto, a single office may process several hundred
consumer bankruptcies a year. Several large firms of trustees also operate across Canada.
32 See ntI, supra note 3, s. 71(2).
33 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1998) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code].
34 See BL4, supra note 3, s. 116(1).
35 Ibid. s. 30(1).
36 In a typical estate, non-preferred, unsecured creditors will be lucky to collect even five cents
on the dollar of their proven claims. In a consumer bankruptcy they will often receive nothing.
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in the BIA.3 7 Where the debtor's estate, after the claims of secured
creditors have been deducted, amounts to less than $5,000, the estate
may be administered summarily ("summary administration"). 38 This
reduces the role of creditors in the administration of the estate still
further. Recent statistics show that 90 per cent or more of consumer
bankruptcies are administered summarily.39
The court structure under the Canadian bankruptcy system
differs fundamentally from the structure of its American counterpart.
Canada has no separate system of bankruptcy courts.40 Instead, the
superior courts in each of the provinces are invested with plenary
bankruptcy jurisdiction.41 Rights of appeal lie from their decisions to the
provincial courts of appeal, and thence to the Supreme Court of
Canada.42 In practice, a bankruptcy judge will seldom be involved in a
consumer bankruptcy, and then only at the discharge stage if the
discharge is opposed, which is rare.
V. INITIATING A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING
It is very easy for a Canadian consumer to go bankrupt under the
BIA. 43 It appears to be even easier than it is for an American consumer to
37 See BiA, supra note 3, s. 136. Creditors are divided into secured, preferred, ordinary, and
deferred unsecured creditors.
38 Ibid. s. 49(6). The consequences of a summary administration are spelled out in section 155,
39 See T. Craddock, "Bankruptcy Discharge Statistics, 1988-1998" in Roundtable on Recent
Consumer Bankruptcy Developments: Materials for Distribution (Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto, 21 July 1999) [unpublished, on file with author] 1 at 1-6 [hereinafter Roundtable].
40 Canada has a system of federal courts encompassing the Federal Court of Canada (FCC),
with a trial and appellate division, and the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court of
Canada is the final appellate tribunal on questions of provincial as well as federal law. The
jurisdiction of the FCC is limited to matters of federal law and does not include bankruptcy law. The
reason for this anomaly is historical. The Fcc was only established in 1971 and, at this late date, it
would have been very unpopular politically for the federal government to transfer bankruptcy
jurisdiction to the federal courts. It should also be appreciated that under Canada's constitution all
superior court judges are appointed by the federal government: see Constitution Act, 1867, supra
note 7, s. 96. This explains why the federal government felt quite comfortable about leaving
bankruptcy jurisdiction in the hands of provincial court judges.
41 See BmA, supra note 3, s. 183(1).
42 Ibi. ss. 183(2)-(3).
43 1 am referring to the ease of acquiring the status of a bankrupt, not to the quite separate
question of obtaining a discharge from the debtor's liabilities.
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go bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Code.44 The simple qualifying
requirements under Canadian law are that the consumer must be
insolvent, must reside or have property in Canada, and that his or her
debts amount to $1,000 or more.45 In terms of the paperwork, all that is
required is a written assignment-a standard document of a couple of
pages, accompanied by a preliminary statement of affairs, the
nomination of a trustee who has agreed to act on the debtor's behalf
(rarely a problem since trustees advertise widely), and "acceptance" of
the assignment by the official receiver.46 The official receiver cannot
refuse to accept the assignment if the documents are in order. A modest
filing fee is payable, but it only amounts to $50. Unlike in the United
States, there is no judicial intervention at this stage. Likewise, there is no
enquiry before the assignment becomes effective, as there may be under
the British system, to determine the circumstances leading to the
bankruptcy.
The BlA has no precise counterpart to the "abuse" provision in
section 707(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Section 181(1) of
the BIA confers a seemingly open-ended jurisdiction on the Canadian
bankruptcy court to annul an assignment, but apparently there are no
reported cases of this discretion having been exercised because the
consumer could have made a viable proposal.47 However, this pro-
debtor position must not be misconstrued. It does not mean that
everything is plain sailing once the debtor has made his or her
assignment. Rather, as is explained in Part VII(B), below, as a result of
the 1997 amendments to the BIA, the debtor may face two formidable
hurdles. First, if the debtor has non-exempt income, he or she may be
required to pay it over to the trustee.48 Second, if the trustee is of the
4 4 Supra note 33.
45 See BtA, supra note 3, s. 2, "insolvent person."
4 6 Ibid. ss. 49(3)-(4). See also Rules Amending the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Rules, S.O.R./98-
240, s. 1, Rule 85; and Forms 22-23. Section 49(4) of the BL4, supra note 3, requires the official
receiver to appoint a trustee selected, as far as possible, by reference to the most interested
creditors if ascertainable at the time. I am told this does not happen in practice, and that the
assignment completed by the debtor usually includes the name of the trustee consulted by the
debtor.
47 The case law is collected in L.W. Houlden & G.B. Morawetz, The 1999 Annotated
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1998) at D§32 [hereinafter The
Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act]. The court also has general jurisdiction under section
187(5) of the BIA,supra note 3, to review, rescind, or vary any order made under its bankruptcy
jurisdiction. This power does not seem to apply to an assignment, since an assignment does not
derive its force from a court order.
48 See LlA, supra note 3, s. 68.
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view that the debtor could have made a viable proposal to his or her
creditors under Part III, Division 2 of the BIA and so reports to the
bankruptcy court,49 the court will not be able to grant the debtor an
unconditional discharge.
VI. SCOPE OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE, EXEMPTIONS,
SECURED CLAIMS, AND STATUS OF FUTURE INCOME
In this area, the fault lines between the Canadian and American
approaches deepen perceptibly, and we encounter the first phase of the
treatment of future income that so deeply divides the two systems. I will
address each sub-question in the order in which it appears in the title of
this section.
A. Scope of the Bankruptcy Estate
Under the BIA, after the debtor's assignment, the trustee
succeeds to all of the debtor's property, unless exempted 5 O "Property" is
defined non-exhaustively in the Act and includes all real and personal
property, present and future, wherever located.51 It is this
comprehensive definition and its extension to after-acquired property
that provides the historical explanation for what Americans would
regard as a major deviation from the fresh start policy5 2 Anglo-
Canadian lawyers, on the other hand, have been exposed for so long to
the definition that they see nothing incongruous about all of the debtor's
non-exempt property falling into the estate prior to an unconditional
discharge of the debtor's liabilities.
4 9 1bid. s. 170.1(2)(c).
50OIbid. s. 71(2).
Si Ibid. s. 2, "property." See also subsections 67(1)(c)-(d), which state the following:
(1) The property of a bankrupt divisible among his creditors .... shall comprise ...
(c) all property wherever situated of the bankrupt at the date of his bankruptcy or that
may be acquired by or devolve on him before his discharge, and
(d) such powers in or over or in respect of the property as might have been exercised by
the bankrupt for his own benefit.
52 This is because section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, only vests in the
debtor's estate all non-exempt legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property "as of the
commencement of the case."
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B. Exempt Property
In the area of property excluded from the estate, Canadian and
American law share familiar territory. Both systems agree that the
debtor must not be stripped of all assets. The debtor and his or her
family must be allowed to keep the basic necessities of life, and the
debtor must be able to pursue his or her livelihood. Canadian law,
however, goes further than American law in allowing the scope of the
exemptions to be determined by provincial law. There is no optional list
of federal exemptions in the BIA as there is under section 522 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Table A-153 shows, as might be expected, that the
Canadian provinces differ widely in their exemption policies, although
not as widely as the American states differ among themselves. Alberta
and Saskatchewan confer the most generous exemptions, with Quebec
ranking third.54 Ontario, Canada's richest and most populous province,
has the dubious distinction of having the most parsimonious exemptions.
Chart 155 tracks the provincial bankruptcy rates against the
provincial exemptions. American authors have frequently debated the
impact of high exemptions on bankruptcy rates; the better view appears
to be that there is no consistent correlation between the level of
exemptions and the number of bankruptcies. As Chart 1 shows, this also
appears to be true of the Canadian provinces for the 1991-1996 period.
Ontario, with the lowest exemptions, had above average bankruptcy
rates. Saskatchewan, with the highest exemptions, had below average
bankruptcy rates.
C. Status of Secured Claims5 6
It apjears that the bankrupt American consumer receives
substantially better treatment in retaining property subject to a security
interest than does a Canadian bankrupt. This is even truer with respect
53 See Appendix, Table A-i, below.
54 British Columbia would have ranked third if recent amendments, which came into effect
after 1997, had been included in the Table.
55 See Appendix, Chart 1, below.
56 For a much more detailed treatment of this topic, see the following articles in this
Symposium: T.M. Buckwold, "Holding the High Ground: The Position of Secured Creditors in
Consumer Bankruptcies and Proposals" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 277; and W.C. Whitford,
"Secured Creditors and Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J.
339.
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to an American debtor's position under a Chapter 13 plan. Under both
Chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor has the benefit of
the automatic stay provided by section 362(a) and, with respect to
Chapter 7 filings, is given the option of returning the collateral;
redeeming it for its actual value if it is exempt property under section
522 and involves personal property intended primarily for personal
family or household use;S7 and redeeming the property for the full
amount of the debt in other cases. Still another option open to the
debtor, if the secured party agrees, is to reaffirm the security
agreement.58 Since most bankrupt debtors are not in a position to
redeem (if they could raise the cash it is unlikely they would have gone
bankrupt in the first place), the reaffirmation route is a common option
in the United States, just as it is in Canada, for items essential to the
debtor's lifestyle or livelihood. 59 Under Chapter 7, the debtor may also
avoid nonpurchase-money security interests in exempt household goods
and other personal property.60 It appears to be unsettled whether the
Bankruptcy Code permits the debtor to retain the collateral by simply
maintaining the payments, a solution that would obviously be a debtor's
first choice.61
A Chapter 13 plan clearly permits a debtor to reinstate a security
agreement in default by offering a cure,62 including cure of mortgage
payments in default on a home mortgage, after the mortgagee has
accelerated payments due under the mortgage and commenced
foreclosure proceedings. 63 Chapter 13 also permits a plan to modify the
rights of secured creditors, unless they concern a security interest on the
debtor's principal residence.64 On both these grounds (as well as others)
57 See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, §§ 521(2) (A), 722.
5 8 Ibid. § 524(c).
59 However, as discussed in Part X, below, the 1L4 contains no statutory safeguards to protect
the debtor against abusive reaffirmation agreements.
60 See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, § 522(f)(1)(A).
61 See In re Gerling, 175 B.R. 295 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) and earlier case law cited therein.
62 See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, § 1322(b) (3).
63 SeeIn re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982).
64 See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, § 1322(b)(2). In In re Taddeo, supra note 63, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit distinguished between the right to cure and the right to modify
and held that the debtor's right to cure also extended to home mortgages.
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the debtor has a strong incentive to invoke Chapter 13 to keep secured
creditors at bay.65
The Canadian position is substantially different. There is no
automatic stay in a straight bankruptcy for the debtor's benefit against
the enforcement of a security interest. However, the trustee can apply
for a stay that, if granted, cannot exceed six months.66 There is a similar
but expanded provision in the case of a consumer proposal under Part
III, Division 2.67 It only has a limited effect because a secured creditor is
not bound by a proposal, even if it has been accepted by the other
creditors, unless the secured creditor has filed a proof of claim. 68 The BIA
has no counterpart to section 522(f)69 of the Bankruptcy Code. However,
the exemption legislation in several of the provinces invalidates
nonpurchase-money security interests in exempted property.70
As far as rights of redemption under the Canadian legislation are
concerned, in a straight bankruptcy that right is conferred on the trustee
under section 128(3) of the BIA on payment of the debt or the value of
the security as assessed by the secured party. However, it is not clear to
65 See E. Warren & J.L. Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors: Text, Cases, and
Problems, 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1996) at 338ff.
66 See BiA, supra note 3, s. 69.3(2). Business debtors have much more significant protection
under section 244, which requires a secured creditor holding a security interest in all or substantially
all of the debtor's inventory, accounts receivable, or other property to give the debtor ten days'
notice before enforcing the security interest. For the history of this restriction, see "Bankruptcy Law
Reform," supra note 18 at 399.
6 7 See BIA, supra note 3, s. 69.2(4).
68 Ibid. s. 66.28(2)(b). Debtors under a Part III, Division 1 proposal are better off because
secured parties can be included in a proposal without their consent. However, the proposal will not
bind the secured creditors until they approve it by the requisite majority in number and value of
claims. These features explain why secured creditors are subject to an automatic stay under sections
69(1) and 69.1(1). The position under a Part III, Division 2 proposal is ambiguous because of the
provisions in sections 66.34 and 66.4(1).
69 See note 60, supra, and accompanying text.
70 It has been held in Ontario that the exemptions in the Execution Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E-24
do not apply to secured parties; they apply only to creditors levying execution against the debtor's
property: see Re Vanhove (1994), 20 O.R. (3d) 653 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)). The Canadian Bar
Association-Ontario Subcommittee on the Ontario Personal Property Security Act has made
recommendations to the Ontario government for amendments to the Ontario Personal Property
Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P-10 [hereinafter opmsA], and other legislation. The amendments will
include a provision entitling a consumer debtor to claim the same exemption from enforcement of a
security interest as is available to a debtor under the Execution Act: see Canadian Bar Association-
Ontario, Submission to the Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations Concerning the Personal
Property Security Act (Toronto: CBAO, 1998) at 34-36 (Recommendation 28). Note that the
provincial personal property security legislation also contains a provision precluding a security
interest in after-acquired consumer goods unless the debtor acquires rights in the goods within ten
days after the secured party has given value.
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what extent this right also enures for the benefit of the debtor. With
respect to rights of reinstatement of the security agreement after default
by the debtor, many of the provincial personal property security statutes
contain varying rights of reinstatement in favour of consumer debtors.71
Presumably, these rights survive the consumer's bankruptcy, at least in
the case of property excluded from the trustee's reach under section
67(1) of the BIA. In the case of a consumer proposal, section 69.2(4) of
the BiA also appears to confer an implicit right of reinstatement in the
consumer's favour, not limited to residential real estate, in the case of
security for a debt that does not become due until more than six months
after the date of approval or deemed approval of the proposal. However,
the right is contingent on the court first issuing a stay of proceedings by
the secured creditor, and the stay cannot exceed six months. 72
Based on the above summary, one may fairly conclude that the
BiA has so far paid very little attention to the needs of insolvent
consumers holding motor vehicles, essential household items, and other
property subject to a security interest and necessary for the consumer's
livelihood and general well-being. However, I understand the practical
position is substantially better than the black letter law; trustees will
usually cooperate in allowing the debtor's budget to include payments on
secured claims for essential items, including payments on a home
mortgage and a vehicle required for transportation, and secured
creditors will be equally amenable to such arrangements because it
usually also serves their interests. 73
D. Surplus Income Payment Requirements
I have already summarized the 1997 amendments to section 68
of the BIA74 that require the trustee to fix the share of the debtor's
income that the debtor is required to pay to the trustee for distribution
71 See, for example, OPPSA, supra note 70, s. 66(2).
72 A further difficulty arises because it is not clear whether section 69.2(4)(b) of the BlM, supra
note 3, applies where the secured party has invoked an acceleration clause, thereby taking the debt
out of subsection 4(b) and bringing it under subsection 4(a) as a debt due at the date of approval.
Section 66.34 invalidates acceleration clauses based on the consumer debtor's insolvency or the fact
of a proposal having been filed. However, given the history and origins of the section, it is likely that
it was only meant to apply to executory contracts and not to security agreements.
73 However, it is not clear to what extent these sensible practices can be continued, having
regard to the surplus income payment requirements under section 68 and the Superintendent's cost
of living standards under that section: see Part IV, above.
74 See Part IV(B), above.
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among the creditors.75 This requirement is such a radical departure from
American philosophy that more needs to be said about it.
The concept of requiring the debtor to pay over surplus income
already appeared in the British Bankruptcy Act, 1914.76 However, the
requirement was not triggered until the court made such an order on the
trustee's application. In practice, it appears, trustees generally abstained
from using this power, preferring to wait until the debtor made his or her
discharge application.77 The debtor's quest for an easy discharge order
was regarded as providing sufficient incentive for him or her to turn over
part of his or her surplus income voluntarily before the discharge
hearing. If the trustee made an application for an income payment
order, one of the factors required to be taken into consideration by the
court was "essential" expenditures incurred by the debtor for the
maintenance of the debtor, his or her family, and dependants. This
formula still appears in the current British Insolvency Act 1986.78
The Canadian story is more complicated. As previously
indicated, section 67(1)(c) of the BI4 and its predecessors have long
provided that, subject to the authorized exemptions, the debtor's present
and future property belongs to the estate. However, there was
considerable uncertainty whether "property" included the debtor's
income. In Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. Lalonde,79 the Supreme Court
of Canada held that it did. The result was regarded as unsatisfactory,
since it meant either that the trustee could require the debtor to turn
over all of the debtor's income or that the debtor was only entitled to
claim the exemptions applicable under provincial non-bankruptcy law.
To clarify the position, section 68 (then section 39A) was added to the
BIA in 1966,80 authorizing the trustee to make an application to the court
for an income payment order, and requiring the trustee to do so if
required by the inspectors. The amendment only applied to the debtor's
earnings from employment. The court was given complete discretion in
responding to the application, "having regard to the family
75 Commonly referred to in Commonwealth insolvency literature as an income payment order.
76 (U.K.), 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 59, s. 51. See further U.K., Insolvency Law Review Committee,
Insolvency Law and Practice, Cmnd 8558 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1982) (Chair:
Sir K. Cork) at paras. 591-97 [hereinafter "Cork Report"].
77See "Cork Report," supra note 76.
78 (U.K.), 1986, c. 45, s. 310 [hereinafter Insolvency Act 1986]. See also I.F. Fletcher, The Law
of Insolvency, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) at 203-05 [hereinafter Law of Insolvency].
79 [1952] 2 S.C.R. 109.
80 SeeAn Act to amend the Bankruptcy Act, S.C. 1966, c. 32, s. 10.
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responsibilities and personal situation of the bankrupt."8 ' In a later
decision, the Supreme Court of Canada held that section 68 constituted
a complete code with respect to the trustee's power to attach a debtor's
earnings.8 2
In practice, the result appears to have been very similar to the
British experience-in consumer cases, trustees were reluctant to
exercise their powers because it was time consuming, because the
trustees were poorly paid for such efforts, and because there was no
consistency in the payment orders made by courts.83 In 1991, the
Superintendent sought to bring some moral suasion to bear by issuing a
directive that incorporated the Superintendent's "Guidelines" for
calculating surplus income.8 4
This is where matters stood when Working Group 1 of the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Advisory Committee (BIAC), established by
the federal government in 1993 to make recommendations with respect
to Phase II of the revision of the BIA, reviewed the position. The
creditors were still very unhappy about the trustees' failure to exercise
their section 68 powers. The federal officials probably shared the
sentiment. In any event, section 68 was completely revised,85 adding
enormous muscle to the section to ensure that future debtors paid over
their surplus income, and trustees would not neglect their obligations.
Some sense of the importance that the federal officials attached to these
goals may be gleaned from the sheer length of the revised section 68: no
less than 14 subsections, to which must be added another four printed
pages in the Superintendent's supporting directive of 30 April 1998, as
modestly amended on 5 January 1999.86
8 1 Ibid.
8 2 SeeMarzettiv. Marzetti, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 765.
83 The pre-1998 case law is summarized in TheAnnotated Bankruptcy and InsolvencyAct, supra
note 47, F§52.
84 See Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Directive No. 17R2: Surplus Income (issued
18 April 1990). The directive was revised on 2 April 1993.
85 See 1997Amendments, supra note 20, s. 60.
86 See Directive No. 11, supra note 21. The use of statutory guidelines in lieu of discretionary
court orders to determine a debtor's quantum liabilities has also been adopted by the Canadian
federal government for parental support obligations under the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd
Supp.), c. 3, as am. by An Act to amend the Divorce Act, the Family Orders and Agreements
Enforcement Assistance Act, the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act and the Canada
Shipping Act, S.C. 1997, c. 1: see Federal Child Support Guidelines, S.O.R.197-175, which was
considered for the first time at the appellate level in Francis v. Baker (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 481
(C.A.), currently on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The partiality for regulatory standards
to determine surplus income of bankruptcy debtors is not peculiar to Canada; it also appears in the
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The following are the key features of section 68 as amplified by
the directive. The trustee is initially responsible for determining the
debtor's monthly income after deducting expenses reflecting the debtor's
personal and family situation.8 7 In the case of an employed deb'tor, the
expenses cover statutory payments for income taxes and the like, and
may include non-discretionary expenses, such as child support and
spousal maintenance payments.
The trustee must next determine the debtor's available surplus
income by consulting the Superintendent's Standards (see Table 1,
below) showing the allowable living expenses for a person in the debtor's
personal or family situation. These standards were apparently derived
from a Statistics Canada compilation of the income requirements of low-
income individuals and families.88 As of January 1999, the cost of living
allowance was $1,492 for a single person, $1,864 for a couple, and $2,319
for a family of three.
The Superintendent's directive provides that where the total
monthly surplus income of the debtor is equal to or greater than $100
and less than $1,000, the debtor is required to pay 50 per cent of the
surplus income as calculated under the directive.8 9 If the surplus income
is $1,000 or greater, the trustee must require the debtor to pay over at
least 50 per cent, and may require payment of up to 75 per cent.90
Australian Bankruptcy Act and supporting regulations: see Bankruptcy Act, 1966 (Cth), Part VI,
Division 4B [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act 1966]. See also D.J. Rose,Australian Bankruptcy Law, 10th
ed. (North Ryde, N.S.W.: Law Book, 1994) at 152-53; and Commonwealth of Australia, Bankruptcy
Legislation Amendment Bill 1995: Report by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee (Canberra: The Committee, 1995) at 49-57.
8 7 See Directive No. 11, supra note 21, s. 4(1).
88 See National Council of Welfare, Poverty Profile 1994 (Ottawa: National Council of
Welfare, 1996) at 89, which provides Statistics Canada cut-off figures for low-income families for
1995.
89 See Directive No.11, supra note 21, s. 5(2)(a).
90 Ibid. s. 5(2)(b).
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TABLE 1
SUPERINTENDENT'S STANDARDS:
1999 TOTAL MONTHLY SURPLUS INCOME
Persons
Net ($)
Monthly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Income (1492) (1864) (2319) (2807) (3138) (3468) (3799)
1592 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
1692 200 0 0 0 0 0 0
1792 300 0 0 0 0 0 0
1992 500 128 0 0 0 0 0
2192 700 328 0 0 0 0 0
2392 900 528 0 0 0 0 0
2592 1100 728 273 0 0 0 0
2792 1300 928 473 0 0 0 0
2992 1500 1128 673 185 0 0 0
3192 1700 1328 873 385 0 0 0
3392 1900 1528 1073 585 254 0 0
3592 2100 1728 1273 785 454 124 0
3792 2300 1928 1473 985 654 324 0
3992 2500 2128 1673 1185 854 524 193
4192 2700 2328 1873 1385 1054 724 393
Source: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Directive No. 11: Surphs Income (issued 30
April 1998), Appendix "A," online: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy <http://strategis.
ic.gc.ca/SSG/brOlO55e.html> (dated accessed: 19 August 1999). The Superintendent's Standards
are derived from information provided by Statistics Canada. The standards consist of the 1997 base
established by Statistics Canada plus a 1.2 per cent adjustment to the standards due to the 1998
Consumer Price Index, plus a 1.6 per cent adjustment to standards representing the
Superintendent's projection for the 1999 Consumer Price Index. The amounts shown above
represent the monthly total surplus income of the bankrupt over the standards, from which the
surplus income payment should be calculated.
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It is important to emphasize that the directive applies a uniform
standard of cost of living allowances for all debtors in the same family
situation, regardless of their social, economic, or geographic background
and location.91 Seemingly, the trustee has no discretion in determining
the debtor's living needs, except insofar as they fall under the heading of
"non-discretionary monthly expenses." 92 If the debtor wants more, the
debtor can ask for mediation. If this is not successful, the trustee can
apply for a court hearing. Conversely, if the official receiver or a creditor
disagrees with the amount of surplus income determined by the trustee,
either of them can require mediation and, like the debtor or trustee, also
ask for a court hearing. If there is a court hearing, it is not clear how
much discretion the bankruptcy court has in determining the amount of
the debtor's surplus income. Section 68(10) of the BIA requires the court
to act in accordance with the standards established in subsection 68(1)
(i.e., the standards set by the Superintendent), and "having regard to the
personal and family situation of the bankrupt." These criteria seem to be
the same as those incumbent on trustees. As a result, unless courts are
willing to massage the quoted words beyond their intended meaning, or
somehow to find that the Superintendent's Standards are too rigid,
debtors may find that section 68 has forced them into a procrustean
bed.93
91 During the discussions preceding the adoption of the directive, the Canadian Insolvency
Practitioners Association urged the adoption of differential scales depending on the debtor's
province of residence and the size of the community of the debtor's residence, but its efforts were
unsuccessful. The pre-1998 guidelines also drew no geographical distinctions with respect to
differences in the cost of living within a province and between the provinces. This silence influenced
the court's decision in Re Demyen (1999), 4 C.B.R. (4th) 67 (Sask. Q.B.), in which the court rejected
the trustee's argument that the debtor should be required to hand over a larger share of his income
because the cost of living in Regina, Saskatchewan, was lower than elsewhere in Canada.
92 Directive No. 11, supra note 21, s. 4(1).
93 At the Conference, David Stewart, District Assistant Superintendent, Toronto, presented a
report on the preliminary effects of the 1997 amendments to the BIA: see D. Stewart, "A Brief
Review of Preliminary Data since the April 30th Amendments" (Conference on the Contemporary
Challenges of Consumer Bankruptcies in a Comparative Context, Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto, 21-22 August 1998) [unpublished] at 3, which included the following information for the
Toronto bankruptcy district for the months of May through July 1998:
[O]ut of a total of 3270 personal bankruptcies 472 (14.4%) of them had surplus income in
accordance with the standards. Of the 472, 363 (76.9%) have agreed to make monthly
payments in accordance with the standards while the remaining 109 (23.1%) have agreed
to make payments for lesser amounts. 58 (53.2%) individuals of the group of 109 have
agreed to pay monthly amounts within $100 of the amounts established by the standards;
35 (32.1%) individuals of the 109 have agreed to pay monthly amounts of between $100
to $300 below the standard; and 16 (14.7%) individuals of the group of 109 have agreed
to make payments more than $300 below the standards.
Later statistics for the whole of Canada collected by the osB for the period May-October 1998
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Even if one accepts the conceptual soundness of a surplus
income payment requirement, I am not persuaded that we need the
remarkable complexities of section 68. I am also sceptical that the
formidable resources of the Canadian federal government should be
marshalled to act as debt collector for creditors who, in many cases, will
have extended consumer credit on a consensual basis and should largely
be able to look after their own interests. As I note below, since 1919
Canadian courts have exercised a very broad discretion in determining
the terms of a debtor's discharge. They may still have that discretion
and, if they do, the Canadian Parliament may unwittingly have
introduced a double standard for curial review: one in entertaining
applications to determine surplus income payment requirements, and
another in setting discharge terms.
VII. DISCRETIONARY DISCHARGES OR
STATUTORY FRESH START?
I come now to the single most important difference between the
Canadian and American bankruptcy systems. This is the fact that, under
Canadian law, the court makes the final decision about the disposition of
the debtor's pre-bankruptcy debts, whereas American law entitles the
debtor to a discharge, subject to a long (and growing) list of exclusions.
This assumes the debtor has not forfeited the right of a discharge
altogether because of the types of misconduct and other events listed in
section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code. These and other qualifications to
the American debtor's right to a discharge should caution us against
drawing simplistic conclusions about the differences between the
Canadian and American discharge rules. I will address the Canadian
position first, and then discuss the American position to the extent that
their rules are not referred to in the description of the Canadian
position.
showed that out of a total of 42,009 personal bankruptcies, 4,550, (10.8 per cent) had surplus
income in accordance with the regulatory standards. Of the 4,550 that had surplus income, 3,883
(85.3 per cent) agreed to make monthly payments in accordance with the standards, while the
remaining 667 (14.7 per cent) agreed to make payments for lesser amounts: see Roundtable, supra
note 39.
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A. Canadian Position
The discharge provisions in the Canadian 1919 Act 94 were based
on the discharge provisions in the British 1883Act,9s as re-enacted in the
British Bankruptcy Act, 1914.96 The 1883 Act enshrined for the first time
a general discharge policy for non-trader debtors as well as trader
debtors,97 thereby marking a major step in the evolution of the British
bankruptcy system.
There was some criticism in Canada about the decision to follow
the structure and concepts in the 1883 Act instead of allowing Canadian
drafters to prepare an essentially home-grown product.9 8 However, the
commentators agreed that the fresh start policy in the American
National Bankruptcy Act of 189899 was quite unacceptable in Canada,
and that discretionary discharge rules administered by the courts struck
a much better balance between the interests of creditors, debtors, and
society. Lewis Duncan, a highly regarded Toronto insolvency
practitioner, expressed a common sentiment when he wrote that
laxity in the administration of this part of the [United States] Act has been one of the
principal causes of the dissatisfaction with United States Bankruptcy statutes, which have
too often been administered as if they were a clearing house for the liquidation of debts,
a sort of constant Jubilee. 100
Under the provisions of the Canadian 1919 Act, the debtor was
entitled at any time after making the assignment to apply for a discharge
order.101 The trustee was required to file a report with the court before
the hearing, which the court was then obliged to take into account in
making its order. Except in the circumstances described in section 58(5),
the court had a complete discretion (1) to grant or refuse the discharge;
(2) to suspend the effectiveness of the order for a specified time; or (3)
94 Supra note 5.
95 Supra note 14.
9 6 Supra note 76.
9 7 Supra note 14, ss. 28-31.
98 See T.G.W. Telfer, Reconstructing Bankruptcy Law in Canada: 1867 to 1919. From an Evil to
a Commercial Necessity (S.J.D. Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1999) [unpublished]
at 313-14. I am much obliged to Tom Telfer, a former graduate student of mine, for making a copy
of his excellent thesis available to me.
9 9 Supra note 4.
100 L. Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922) at 38.
101 Supra note 5, ss. 58-59.
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to make a conditional order linked to the debtor's future earnings or his
or her income or after-acquired property.102 Pursuant to section 58(5),
the court had to refuse or suspend the discharge for a minimum period
of two years if the debtor had committed an offence under the Act or
had committed an offence connected with the bankruptcy proceedings,
unless the court determined for special reasons to make another order.
On proof of the facts enumerated in section 59, the court was
likewise obliged to refuse or suspend the discharge for a minimum of
two years. The period could be reduced if the only complaint about the
debtor's conduct was that his or her assets were worth less than fifty
cents on the dollar. Alternatively, the court could require the debtor to
consent to judgment against him or her out of future income or after-
acquired property. The nine situations enumerated in section 59, apart
from the deficiency in the debtor's assets, covered various forms of pre-
bankruptcy misconduct by the debtor and included the fact that the
debtor had been a previous bankrupt.
A suspensory or conditional order made under section 58(5) was
not unremitting. The court could modify its order after a year, if satisfied
that there was no reasonable prospect of the debtor being able to meet
the terms of the order.103
The revisionary 1949 Act,104 while making various minor changes
to the discharge provisions, added a new feature by deeming the debtor's
assignment to trigger an application for discharge.105 This could be
heard no sooner than three months, and no later than twelve months,
after the debtor's assignment.10 6 In order to simplify the administration
of the discharge machinery still further, the 1992 amendments to the BIA
added a provision entitling a first-time bankrupt to an automatic
discharge nine months after the assignment unless, before the expiration
of this period, the trustee, the Superintendent, or a creditor filed an
objection.107
From the 1919 Act onwards, the trustee has always been obliged
to furnish the court with a report on the debtor's conduct before and
during bankruptcy, and to state his or her opinion about the probable
102 Ibid. s. 58(4).
103 Ibid. s. 58(5).
1 04 Supra note 16.
105 Ibid. s. 127.
106 Ibid. s. 127(2).
1 0 7 See Bti, supra note 3, s. 168.1(1)(f), as am. by 1992 Amendments, supra note 3, s. 61(1).
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cause or causes of the bankruptcy, and whether the deficiency between
the estate's assets and liabilities had been satisfactorily accounted for.
The 1949 Act also amended the earlier legislation by drawing a
distinction between those situations in which the court had complete
discretion in dealing with a discharge application, and those in which it
was required to dismiss the application or make a conditional order.108
The latter situation involved a much enlarged list of thirteen species of
pre-bankruptcy and intra-bankruptcy misconduct, 09 the one most
commonly relied on by creditors being that the debtor's assets were
worth less than fifty cents on the dollar of the debtor's unsecured
liabilities.
B. 1997Amendments
This discharge structure still exists but, as previously noted, a
sharp twist was added to it by the 1997 amendments to the BIA. The
trustee's report to the court must now include a recommendation
whether the discharge order should be conditional,11 0 having regard to
(1) whether the bankrupt has complied with the section 68 requirements
for the remittance of the bankrupt's surplus income; (2) the total
amount paid over by the debtor to the estate; and (3) whether the debtor
could have made a viable proposal."/ If a debtor objects to the trustee's
recommendation he or she can ask for mediation.1 12 If the issues are not
resolved by mediation, the court will proceed with the hearing of the
discharge application."13
The list of circumstances enumerated in section 173(1), now
fifteen in number, requiring a court to dismiss the application or to make
a conditional or suspensory order, has also been amended to match the
trustee's new reporting obligations. They now include the fact that the
bankrupt has failed to meet his or her section 68 payment obligations or
could have made a viable proposal."t4 The 1997 amendments must surely
have met the creditors' fondest expectations.
10 8Supra note 16, s. 129.
109 Ibid. ss. 130(l)(a)-(m).
110 See mA, supra note 3, s. 170.1(1).
III Ibid. ss. 170.1(2)(a)-(c).
112 Ibid. s.170.1(4).
113 Ibid. s.170.1(7).
114 Ibid. ss. 173(1)(m)-(n), as am. by 1997Amendments, supra note 20, s. 103(1).
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C. The Real World of Consumer Debtors and Discharge Applications
The rationales for the immense efforts put into the 1997
amendments and supporting directives and rules under the BiA were the
following. 15 It was said that a large number of Canadian consumers
were abusing the bankruptcy system, that "going bankrupt" had become
too easy, that bankruptcy had lost its stigma, and that many of the
bankrupts had surplus income and could have made a viable consumer
proposal. Many anecdotal stories were cited to support these allegations,
but no independent statistical studies were cited, although the large
Canadian credit grantors could easily have sponsored such studies or
made available their own records for public examination and study. 116
The cumulative evidence provided by the available Canadian
studies do not support the allegations. Undoubtedly, a modest
percentage of bankrupts have a sizeable surplus income117 (although
there is a good deal of controversy and confusion over what that
percentage is), but they do not represent the norm. In what is still a
leading Canadian study based on a large sample of bankrupts, Wayne
Brighton and Justin Connidis reported that consumer bankrupts did not
"fit the stereotype of 'high rollers walking away from their debts' while
holding on to substantial assets." 118 The authors also found that
consumer bankrupts were primarily drawn from the lowest socio-
economic levels, although they emphasized (as later studies have also
emphasized) that consumer bankrupts are not a homogeneous group.)19
115 See J.S. Ziegel, "Canadian Bankruptcy Reform, Bill C-109, and Troubling Asymmetries"
(1996) 27 Can. Bus. L.J. 108 at 111-12.
116 I spent many hours before the Conference trying to persuade senior officials at major
Canadian banks to participate actively at the Conference and to present statistical reports on their
banks' experience with consumer payment delinquencies and consumer insolvencies. My efforts
were unavailing. I also persuaded a friend of mine, a former chief economist and vice-president of
one of th6 banks, to intercede on my behalf, but he was no more successful. After looking into the
position, the present chief economist of the bank told us that, in addition to time constraints, the
bank's data simply were not good enough to provide the basis for reliable statistics. In 1997, I also
approached the vice-president of another major bank, who had played a very active role in Working
Group I of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Advisory Committee (B[Ac). At her request I supplied
her with a list of written questions involving the bank's consumer credit granting practices and
statistical experience. She replied that most of the questions involved proprietary information, and
that there was no point in her meeting with me.
117 See note 93, supra.
118 J.W. Brighton & J.A. Connidis, Consumer Bankrupts in Canada (Ottawa: Consumer and
Corporate Affairs Canada, 1982) at 76.
119 Ibid. Summary.
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The median indebtedness was $10,865, but median assets were only
$400.120 The median assets realized amounted to $528,121 and only about
6 per cent of the sample of consumer bankruptcies yielded $2,000 or
more.122 In only about one-fifth of the cases was any money available for
distribution among creditors after meeting the trustee's fees and
expenses. The typical amount available for distribution was
$100-$249.123
In their 1998 study for the Office of Consumer Affairs of
Industry Canada, Saul Schwartz and Leigh Anderson found that the
sample of those seeking bankruptcy protection was much poorer
economically than the general population.1 24 Much larger percentages
were found in the lower parts of the distribution (51.8 per cent of the
bankrupts had less than $25,000 in annual incomes versus 33.1 per cent
of the general population), and few were found in the upper parts (3.7
per cent of the bankrupts had incomes greater than $75,000 versus 15.5
per cent of the general population).1 25
The distribution of monthly incomes and expenses in the
Schwartz and Anderson study also "clearly" demonstrated the severe
economic problems faced by the consumers in their sample; almost one-
third reported no monthly take-home pay, while the median pay for
those reporting a positive value was only $1,300 per month.126 Schwartz
and Anderson found that
[o]verall, median net monthly income from all sources was $1,400; that monthly income
would translate into an annual income of $16,800, if it continued for 12 months. By way
of comparison, the Statistics Canada Low Income Cut-Off (LICO) for a single adult
living in a large urban area was $16,874 in 1995. For a family of four, the LICO was
120 Ibid. at 40, Table 15.
121 Ibid. at 60.
122 Ibid. Table 33. The median realized assets are higher than the median declared assets
because apparently they include intangible assets, such as post-bankruptcy income tax refunds,
which are not included in the statement of assets at the time of bankruptcy: see ibid. at 40, 60.
123 Ibid. at 64.
124 See S. Schwartz & L. Anderson, An Empirical Study of Canadians Seeking Personal
Bankruptcy Protection, (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1998) at 8, online: Industry Canada <http:ll
strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00889e.html> (date accessed: 16 July 1999). A summary of the authors'
findings appears in this Symposium: see S. Schwartz, "The Empirical Dimensions of Consumer
Bankruptcy: Results From a Survey of Canadian Bankrupts" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 83.
125 See Schwartz & Anderson, supra note 124 at 8.
126 Ibid. at 9.
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$31,753. Monthly expenses followed roughly the same pattern as monthly income, with a
median of $1,460.127
Schwartz and Anderson also found that more than one-half of
the potential bankrupts had monthly expenses that were equal to or
greater than their monthly income. Only about 37 per cent had a
monthly surplus, but it was usually quite small.128 The authors therefore
concluded that the possibility of even the debtors in their sample with
surplus income being able to repay their debts, given their current
income, was "remote."129
Equally discouraging is the fact that the sponsors of the 1997
amendments to the BIA ignored the impact of consumer credit on the
rapid increase in the number of consumer bankruptcies, and the close
correlation between the two. The volume of consumer credit in Canada
grew 1,600 per cent between 1966 and 1994 (in absolute dollars terms),
and doubled between 1985 and 1995.130 The number of Canadian
consumer bankruptcies grew from 1,903 in 1966 to 65,432 in 1995.131
Nevertheless, the focus of the 1997 amendments to the BIA was
on the alleged abuses of the consumer bankruptcy system; there was
never a suggestion that the consumer credit industry had contributed to
the problems through the ready availability of consumer credit and the
high cost of that credit.
D. Absence of Creditor Opposition to Discharges
Leaving aside the important demographic and economic data
about bankrupts, it is also relevant to note creditors' actual reaction to
consumer bankruptcies. By all accounts, prior to the 1997 amendments
to the BIA, Canadian creditors only opposed discharges in a very small
number of cases. It appeared to be less than 5 per cent, after excluding
1271bid. [footnote omitted].
128 See ibid. at 9; 26, Table 6 (Panel C).
129 Ibid. at 9. When I prepared this article in the summer of 1998, the results from lain
Ramsay's empirical study, "Individual Bankruptcy: Preliminary Findings of a Socio-Legal Analysis"
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 15, were not available to me. I have therefore not included them either
in this modestly revised version of the article.
130 See J.S. Ziegel, "Canadian Perspectives on the Challenges of Consumer Bankruptcies"
(1997) 20 J. Consumer Poly 199 at 204-05, Fig. 1 [hereinafter "Canadian Perspectives"].
131 Ibid. at 201, Table 1.
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trustees' objections.132 Ironically, in Toronto, trustees were the most
common objectors on the ground that they had not been paid the fees
and disbursements to which they were entitled. 133 Another common
ground of objection by trustees was that the debtor had not attended the
mandatory two counselling sessions required by the BIA. 13 4
Revenue Canada and other federal and provincial agencies also
objected intermittently if the debtor owed taxesl35 or a large sum on
account of student loans. 136 Other types of creditors were largely
132 Unfortunately, hard data were not available to me. My estimate is based on many
conversations with trustees, official receivers, and masters in bankruptcy in Toronto and Edmonton.
133 The fees are determined by the regulations under the BiA. Where this objection is raised
the court usually grants the discharge order on condition that the debtor agrees to consent judgment
for the amount in issue. That amount is payable to the estate but, since the trustee ranks third
among preferred creditors, the prospect of the trustee ending up with most of the post-discharge
payments by the debtor are very good: see BiA, supra note 3, ss. 136(1)(b)(ii)-(iii).
134 Ibid. s. 157.1(3).
135 See L. Frank, "Strategic Consumer Bankruptcies" (Conference on the Contemporary
Challenges of Consumer Bankruptcies in a Comparative Context, Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto, 21-22 August 1998) [unpublished].
136 Before the 1997 amendments to the BiA, federal and provincial loan grantors were in the
same position as other creditors with debts owed to them, and were therefore subject to the same
discharge provisions. The effect of section 178(1)(g) of the BiA, supra note 3, as am. by 1997
Amendments, supra note 20, s. 105(2), was to prevent discharge of the student loan debt where the
bankruptcy occurred before the date on which the bankrupt ceased to be a full- or part-time
student, or within two years after the date on which the student ceased to be a full- or part-time
student. Pursuant to section 178.1 of the BiA, supra note 3, as am. by 1997Amendments, supra note
20, s. 105(3), two years after a bankrupt had ceased to be a full- or part-time student, a court could
grant dispensation from section 178(1)(g) if the court was satisfied that (1) the bankrupt had acted
in good faith in connection with the bankrupt's liabilities under the loan; and that (2) the bankrupt
had and would continue to experience financial difficulty to such an extent that the bankrupt would
be unable to pay the liabilities under the loan. Without prior warning, the February 1998 federal
budget announced the federal government's intention to postpone a bankrupt's ability to obtain a
discharge from student loans for a ten-year period, and to repeal the court's dispensing powers
under section 178.1. Despite strong protests from student associations, trustees, and the Canadian
Bar Association, the government proceeded with the amendments: see Budget Implementation Act,
1998, S.C. 1998, c. 21, ss. 103, amending BLt, supra note 3, s. 178. On the whole problem of student
loans, see S. Schwartz, "The Dark Side of Student Loans: Debt Burden, Default, and Bankruptcy"
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ. 307.
At my request, Martha Hundert, LL.B. III, University of Toronto, 1998-99, prepared a
table analyzing opposed student loan discharge applications, which provides detailed information
about the 94 reported discharge applications she was able to find on Quicklaw. Sixty-three of the
cases were from Saskatchewan; British Columbia was second with 15; and Ontario was last with only
1 reported objection. Average monthly income of debtors in the 75 reports where this information
was available was $2,239; median monthly income was $2,040. The average percentage of
outstanding student loans to total indebtedness was 85.73 per cent. (Seventy-three reports contained
sufficient information for this percentage to be calculated.) The number of cases where the
percentage of outstanding student loans exceeded 50 per cent was 64; the percentage equalled 100
per cent in 28 cases. The average monthly payments ordered to be paid by the debtors was $253.30.
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conspicuous by their absence. The reason often given for their failure to
object to the discharge, or to attend the court hearing if they did object,
was that these creditors did not find it a productive use of their
employees' time.
E. How Canadian Courts Exercise Their Discretion
Still, undoubtedly there are cases where the debtor has
substantial surplus income, so it is of interest to learn how Canadian
courts exercised their discretion on discharge applications prior to the
1997 amendments coming into effect in April 1998. Dozens of such cases
have been reported since the 1919 Act.137 Between 1992 and 1998,
Quicklaw 38 reported 94 cases alone involving objections to the
discharge of student loans, but only 20 cases involving non-student
loans.139
It seems that Canadian courts made a conscientious effort to
distinguish between different types of debt: consumer debts versus non-
consumer debts, tort claims versus contractual debts, debts owing to
government agencies versus debts to private sector creditors (to cite
some of the distinctions), as well as the debtor's conduct and culpability,
if any. The courts also frequently reaffirmed the need to balance the
public interest with the debtor's need to rehabilitate himself or herself
and to start a new economic life. In Westmore v. McAfee, 14o a leading
appellate decision, the British Columbia Court of Appeal attempted to
distil the following criteria from earlier case law: (1) the court must have
regard to the interests of the public, the bankrupt, and the creditors; (2)
it is undesirable that a citizen should be so weighed down by debt as to
be incapable of carrying out the regular duties of citizenship; (3) one
object of the BIA is to enable an honest debtor to secure a discharge to
get on with his or her life; (4) the bankruptcy courts should not be
treated as a clearing house for debts, irrespective of the circumstances
(Sixty-seven reports contained the requisite information.) The average duration of conditional
discharge order was 62 months: see M. Hundert, "Analysis of Opposed Student Loan Discharge
Applications 1992-1998" (July 1998) [unpublished, on file with author].
13 7 Supra note 5. See also L.W. Houlden & G.B. Morawetz, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of
Canada, vol. 2, 3d ed., looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1998) at H§16.4ff [hereinafter Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Law of Canada] for annotations on the case law.
138 Quicklaw is Canada's counterpart to Westlaw in the United States.
139 For details of the student loan discharge applications, see note 136, supra. The number of
non-student loan cases is based on a numerical count by Martha Hundert.
140 (1988), 23 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273 (C.A.).
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under which they were created; and (5) the success of any bankruptcy
system depends on the administration of the discharge provisions.l41 As
will be observed, the criteria are unexceptional in themselves, but they
do not add up to a tidy, coherent, and carefully dovetailed set of
guidelines. At the end of the day, much discretion still rested with the
bankruptcy judge.
F. Impact of Trustee's Report
A troubling question raised by the 1997 amendments is how far a
judge is free to discount the trustee's report that the debtor is in breach
of section 68 of the BIA or that the debtor could have made a viable
proposal. If the trustee's report is conclusive on these issues, how far
does it tie the hands of the court in disposing of the discharge
application? On the strength of sections 172(2) and 173(1)(m) and (n), it
seems clear that the court cannot grant an unqualified discharge even if
the court believes this to be the best solution. The court must either
dismiss the application or, more realistically, make a conditional order.
If the court opts for a conditional order requiring future payments by the
debtor, is it bound to apply the Superintendent's Standards? Section
172(2) does not so provide, but if the court is free to ignore the
standards this may establish a double standard of liability for debtors:
one governed by section 68 before the discharge application and the
other by whatever conditional order the court deems appropriate in the
circumstances. On the other hand, if the court believes it is
administratively, if not legally, obliged to apply the Superintendent's
Standards, this may seriously diminish the discretionary role that
Canadian courts have exercised for close to eighty years. Creditors may
welcome such a development; I would regard it as a regressive step.
G. A British Codicil
Since the Canadian discharge system was borrowed from
England, it may be instructive to explain what has happened to the
British discharge rules over the past twenty-five years. In 1957, the
Blagden Committee criticized the technical intricacies of the discharge
141 Ibid. at 280.
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provisions.142 In 1976, the British Insolvency Act was amended to
introduce an automatic discharge rule in a limited number of cases.143
The automatic discharge was triggered five years from the date of
bankruptcy.144
In its 1982 report, the Cork Committee recommended drawing a
distinction between a liquidation of assets order (LAO) and a bankruptcy
order for individual insolvents, and would have allowed a discharge from
an LAO one year after an income payment order had been made.145 The
Committee disapproved of an automatic discharge from a bankruptcy
order, but would have permitted the bankrupt to make a discharge
application one year after the bankruptcy adjudication. As before, the
court would have retained the right to suspend the discharge order or to
make it absolute or conditional.
The British government did not adopt these recommendations.
Instead, the Insolvency Act 1986146 introduced a more lenient discharge
system.1 47 Pursuant to section 279, persons not made bankrupt in the
preceding fifteen years are entitled to an automatic discharge in regular
cases three years after the bankruptcy order, and after two years in
summary administration cases. Where the debtor has failed to comply
with his or her bankruptcy obligations, the official receiver may apply to
the court for an order that the relevant period shall cease to run. In that
case, the order may either specify a suspensory period or may impose
conditions to be met by the debtor before the running of time can
resume. 148
Where an automatic discharge period applies, an income
payment order may not be made at the time of discharge or, if the order
was made earlier, it will only continue beyond the date of discharge if
142 See U.K., Board of Trade Bankruptcy Law Amendment Committee, Report of the
Committee on Bankruptcy Law and Deeds ofArrangement Law Amendment, Cmnd 221 (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957) (Chair: J.B. Blagden) at paras. 53-78.
143 (U.K.), 1976, c. 60, s. 7.
144 The details will be found in I.F. Fletcher, Law of Bankruptcy (Estover, U.K.: Macdonald
and Evans, 1978) at 306-10. See also Justice, Bankruptcy (London: Stevens & Sons, 1975) at paras.
58-71.
14 5 See "Cork Report," supra note 76 at para. 605.
1 4 6 Supra note 78.
147 See Law of Insolvency, supra note 78 at 307-09.
148 See Insolvency Act 1986, supra note 78, s. 279(3).
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the order so provides. However, the order can only run for a maximum
period of three years from the date of the order.149
It will therefore be seen that the current British discharge system
is substantially more favourable to the debtor than the Canadian system.
Under the British system, only the official receiver can apply to have the
running of time suspended for an automatic discharge, and then, only
where the debtor has breached his or her statutory obligations. Also, the
discharge order is absolute. While an income payment order may run
beyond the date of the automatic discharge if the order so provides, it
has a finite life span. No less important, both the making of an income
payment order and its amendment rest with the court. The court's
discretion is not circumscribed by statutorily sanctioned surplus income
standards as is true under the BiA.
The liberalization of the British discharge rules might have been
expected to lead to a rapid increase in the number of British personal
bankruptcies, but it has not happened. In the year following the
adoption of the Insolvency Act 1986 the number of individual bankruptcy
orders actually dropped slightly-from 7,093 in 1986 to 6,994 in 1987.150
As late as 1989, the number of bankruptcy orders was still only 8,138. It
is true that there was a rapid escalation and de-escalation in the number
of bankruptcies between 1991 and 1997 (the number was 32,106 in 1992
and 19,892 in 1997),151 but by all accounts this had more to do with the
state of the British economy than with the more generous discharge
rules introduced by the 1986 legislation. It is also significant that the
great majority of personal bankruptcies in the United Kingdom involve
traders and professional persons, with employed and unemployed
bankrupts apparently only accounting for about one-quarter of the total
number of bankrupts.15 2
The British figures suggest, as is true in North America, that the
character of the bankruptcy regime available to consumers is only one
component in a complex mix of social, economic, and legal factors.
149 Ibid. s. 310(6)(b).
150 See Craddock, supra note 1 at 14. Craddock's statistics are corroborated by statistics and
other information provided to the author by Peter Joyce, Inspector General of the British
Insolvency Service: see Letter from P. Joyce (20 August 1998).
151 See Craddock, supra note 1 at 14.
152 See Society of Practitioners of Insolvency, Personal Insolvency in the United Kingdom
1997-98: Report of 1997 Survey (London: Society of Practitioners of Insolvency, 1998) at 4. Peter
Joyce's statistics show that the ratio of consumer debtors to other debtors varied from 17 per cent to
28 per cent between 1988 and 1997, and that there appears to be a definite upward trend in the
ratio. (I am most grateful to Peter Joyce and John Francis, Technical Secretary of the Society of
Practitioners of Insolvency, for providing me with these data and other information.)
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Nevertheless, the introduction of the concept of an automatic discharge
for first-time bankrupts in England and Wales,153 without regard to the
debtor's pre-bankruptcy conduct, has drawn fire from influential critics
who fear that it might lead to a "progressive erosion of the standards of
commercial morality." 154 Happily, so far the British statistics do not
support these apprehensions.
VIII. THE AMERICAN FRESH START POLICY:
IS THERE A RAPPROCHEMENT?
The description in the preceding section of the surplus income
payment, and now much less discretionary Canadian discharge system, is
likely to make an American reader feel very reassured about the merits
of the fresh start policy. However, it would be a mistake to throw out the
baby with the bathwater. There are many possible variations of an
income payment and discretionary discharge system, and the Canadian
model is only one of them. If proponents of a discretionary discharge
system need to justify their approach, the burden is no less great on
those supporting a fresh start policy. Its superiority, in moral, economic,
and social terms, would not be self-evident to most Commonwealth
observers.
A. Exceptions to the Fresh Start Rule
Even in its home territory, the fresh start policy has been under
regular attack since the turn of this century,155 and well before the
ascendancy of the modem consumer credit industry. The critics have not
all been self-serving creditors, and have included some very reputable
scholars.1 56 In any event, the United States does not have an
153 Scotland has its own insolvency law: see Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 (U.K.), 1985, c. 66.
For further discussion of personal bankruptcy in Scotland, see M. Adler, "The Overseas Dimension:
What Can Canada and the United States Learn from the United Kingdom?" (1999) 37 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 415 at 417-19.
154 Law of Insolvency, supra note 78 at 309.
155 For the details of efforts to modify the fresh start policy between 1898 and 1982, see D.G.
Boshkoff, "Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy
Proceedings" (1982-83) 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69 at 112ff.
156 See, for example, T. Eisenberg, "Bankruptcy Law in Perspective" (1980-81) 28 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 953 at 976-91. For a recent criticism of existing abuses, accompanied by very unorthodox
recommendations, see L.M. LoPucki, "Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy" (1997) 71 Am.
Contemporary Consumer Bankruptcy Systems
unadulterated fresh start policy; as William Whitford suggests, it would
be more accurate to describe it as a "stale start" policy.157
Under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, a consumer's right to
go bankrupt and to obtain a clean discharge under section 727(a) is
subject to four important exceptions: (1) the "abuse" doctrine in section
707(b);158 (2) the long list of liabilities excluded from discharge in
section 523; 159 (3) the denial of a discharge for misconduct under section
727;160 and (4) denial of a discharge where the debtor has been granted
a discharge in a case commenced within six years before the filing of the
petition. 61 Cumulatively, the exceptions significantly dilute a pure fresh
start commitment and invite us to reconsider the foundations of the
policy.
A brief look is warranted at each of these exceptions. Despite its
controversial origin and obvious vagueness, the section 707(b) "abuse"
doctrine appears to draw its inspiration from the same conceptual source
as the Canadian trustee's obligation under section 170.1 of the BIA to
report to the court whether the trustee believes the debtor could have
made a viable proposal. I appreciate that some American critics regard
section 707(b) as an anomaly that is antithetical to the true spirit of the
fresh start policy, and that others have criticized its vagueness and the
great variations in implementation in the substantial abuse standard.162
Nevertheless, it could be argued, just as persuasively, that section 707(b)
reflects the view of a significant constituency that a discharge rule that
only requires the debtor to surrender his or her existing non-exempt
assets easily lends itself to abuse, particularly where the debtor is in a
position to pay all or a substantial part of his or her debts out of future
Bankr. L.J. 461.
157 W.C. Whitford, "Changing Definitions of Fresh Start in U.S. Bankruptcy Law" (1997) 20
J. Consumer Pol'y 178 at 191.
15 8 See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, § 707(b), which provides:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its motion or on a motion by the United States
trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case
filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts
if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this
chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the
debtor.
159 See note 164, infra, and accompanying text.
160 See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, §§ 727(a)(2)-(7).
161 Ibid. §§ 727(a)(8)-(9).
162 See W.R. Wells, J.M. Kurtz & R.J. Calhoun, "The Implementation of Bankruptcy Code
Section 707(b): The Law and the Reality" (1991) 39 Clev. St. L. Rev. 15; and Warren & Westbrook,
supra note 65 at 416-17.
1999]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 37 NOS. I & 2
income. 163 A non-American observer might put the question differently
and enquire about the economic and social imperatives of a rule that
limits an insolvent debtor's liability to his or her existing assets. I return
to the question below.
Turning to the next exception, non-dischargeable debts under
section 523, common law jurisdictions with discretionary discharge
systems also have non-dischargeable debts. However, the list of
exceptions in section 523 is substantially longer than the list in section
178 of the BIA, and very much longer than the modest British and
Australian lists of non-dischargeable debts. Section 523 contains
eighteen exceptions (several of them with very complex structures), 64
including a broad exception for income, property, and employment
taxes, compared to the nine Canadian exclusions, 165 and four each for
England and Wales,166 and Australia. 67
It is a matter for conjecture whether the American list would be
nearly as long if the United States had a discretionary discharge regime,
and what the practical impact is of such a long list. Are the debts ever
collected, or are they based on a vague hope that the debtor may some
day inherit a large fortune or win a rich lottery prize? It would be helpful
to see some empirical studies on these issues. One is also troubled by the
rationales of some of the exclusions. Presumably the non-
dischargeability of taxes]68 is based on the involuntary character of the
credit, although a sceptic might suggest that the tendency of
governments to prefer their claims over the claims of other creditors is
just as influential. 169 A further complication is that a debtor who has
completed all payments under a Chapter 13 plan is entitled to a
163 See In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1989).
164 See, for example, Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, §§ 523(a)(1) (income, property,
employment, or excise debts for varying periods); 523(a)(2) (debt relating to fraudulent conduct);
523(a)(3) (creditors not disclosed by debtor); 523(a)(5) (debt owed for alimony, maintenance, or
support of spouse or child pursuant to agreement or order); 523(a)(15) (debt not of the kind
described in subsection 5 that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation
unless non-discharge will cause hardship to debtor); 523(a)(16) (debt for a fee or assessment to a
membership association for cooperative housing and condominiums); and 523(a)(18) (debt owed
under state law to a state or municipality that is in the nature of support and is enforcable under the
United States Social Security Act).
1 6 5 See B:A, supra note 3, s. 178(1).
1 6 6 See Insolvency Act 1986, supra note 78, ss. 281(3)-(6).
16 7 See Bankruptcy Act 1966, supra note 86, ss. 153(2), 153(2A).
168 See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, § 523(a)(1).
169 For an insightful analysis of these issues, see K. Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing
the Bankruptcy System (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997) c. 7.
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discharge of all debts provided for by the plan, including most of the
debts excluded from discharge under section 523 in the case of a straight
discharge.' 70
The third exception to the fresh start entitlement, found in
section 727(a) and based on the debtor's pre-bankruptcy or post-
bankruptcy misconduct, has no counterpart in the Canadian or English
legislation. In both jurisdictions' 7' the debtor's misconduct is a
discretionary ground on which the court may deny the discharge,
postpone it, or impose conditions, but there is no mandatory rule of
denial. This observer is struck by the contrast between the very generous
fresh start impulse in Chapter 7 on the one hand, and the strict denial
rules in section 727 on the other.
The rationale for the fourth exception, denial of a discharge
where the debtor has obtained a discharge within the preceding six
years,' 72 is again obviously based on a desire to avoid abuse of the
bankruptcy process. What is noteworthy is the rigidity of the exclusion in
sections 727(a)(8) and (9). The court is given no discretion, regardless of
the particular circumstances. This is in contrast to the Canadian
position, where a previous bankruptcy merely precludes the court from
granting the debtor an unconditional discharge.' 73
B. Rationales of the Fresh Start Policy74
I return to the question I posed earlier. The justification for the
American fresh start policy appears to rest on one or more of the
following grounds:
1. Historical, political, and cultural factors.
170 See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, § 1328(a)(2). In practice, it appears that American
bankruptcy courts are reluctant to approve Chapter 13 plans involving major reductions in section
523(a) liabilities: see, for example, In re Kourtakis, 75 B.R. 183 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) and earlier
authorities cited therein. See also note 218, infra, and accompanying text.
171 See mA, supra note 3, s. 172(2); and Insolvency Act 1986,supra note 78, s. 279(3).
172 See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, §§ 727(a)(8)-(9).
173 See mA, supra note 3, ss. 172(2), 173(1)0). Note however that section 173(1)6) applies to
any previous bankruptcy or proposal made by the debtor, no matter how distant in time. However,
since the Canadian court has a very broad discretion under section 172(2), it could discount the
earlier bankruptcy or proposal by suspending the discharge for only a token period where it felt that
there was no causal connection between the earlier event and the current discharge application.
174 Because of space constraints, the arguments in this section are only presented in truncated
form. I hope to be able to develop them more fully on a future occasion.
1999]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL 37 NOS. 1 & 2
2. Impounding a consumer bankrupt's future income would violate
the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution against
involuntary servitude.
3. A coercive payment regime will provoke the consumer's
resistance and encourage the consumer to change jobs or otherwise
become less productive, and perhaps to disappear completely.
4. It is much better to secure the debtor's consent to a voluntary
payment system by giving the debtor incentives that are not available in a
straight bankruptcy.
5. The British-style income payment and discretionary discharge
system is based on the historical role of the British insolvency legislation
as a creditors' debt collection instrument. This was not true of the
United States National Bankruptcy Act of 1898 because pre-bankruptcy
debt collection rules generally fall under state jurisdiction. 75
6. The British-style income payment and discretionary discharge
system is intrusive, paternalistic, and subjective, since no two debtors or
their families have the same needs or face the same circumstances.] 76
7. An attempt to engraft a means test on what is already a very
complex and overburdened American consumer bankruptcy system
would be the straw that breaks the camel's back.177
8. Since the bulk of consumer bankruptcy debts today consist of
consumer credit liabilities, it is more efficient to oblige the credit
industry to internalize its losses, or to tighten its credit granting
standards if creditors believe their losses are too high, than to expect
consumers to resist the impulse. for instant gratification encouraged by
the ready availability of consumer credit.178
9. There is no evidence of large scale abuses in the existing
bankruptcy system; the overwhelming percentage of those seeking
Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection are hopelessly insolvent and would not
be able to pay off their indebtedness in any reasonable time frame even
175 See Boshkoff, supra note 155 at 106.
176 Ibid. at 120-23. See also J. Braucher, "Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code,
Many Cultures" (1993) 67 Am. Bankr. L.J. 501 at 583 [hereinafter "Lawyers and Consumer
Bankruptcy"].
177See E. Warren, "A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy" (1997) 71 Am. Bankr.
L.J. 483 at 505-06 [hereinafter "A Principled Approach"]; the metaphor is mine, not Warren's.
178 See T.H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1986) at 234-36.
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if means testing and a mandatory Chapter 13 regime were to be
introduced.1 79
C. Response to Rationales
From this author's perspective, the rationales I have listed above
differ widely in their persuasiveness. The historical reason explains how
the fresh start policy came to be adopted by Congress and why it still has
such a powerful hold in the United States. However, it does not tell us
why it should be retained in the totally different social and economic
environment of the twenty-first century and whether it is a suitable
model for non-American societies.
The suggestion that an income payment order amounts to
involuntary servitude strikes me as strained, despite the support the
notion has received from respectable sources.180 Whether in England
under the Insolvency Act 1986 or in Canada under section 68 of the BIA,
such an order or its equivalent are not intended to wrest the last penny
from an unfortunate debtor and the debtor's family.
The argument that involuntary payment orders are
counterproductive is more persuasive, and is also familiar to us from
such diverse fields as family support orders and garnishments of wages.
Unfortunately, there appears to be no hard evidence about the
effectiveness of payment orders in England and other Commonwealth
jurisdictions, and it is too soon to assess the results of the new section 68
regime in Canada. Even if the results were mediocre, would this be a
sufficient reason to abandon the concept in the absence of a better
alternative?
Obviously, a consensual payment plan is much more attractive,
but there are two difficulties. The first is to determine what incentives
will be sufficient to draw good prospects into the plan without
overcompensating planholders. The second is to prevent the wrong
debtors from being pressured into a plan. There is much evidence in the
United States about the second danger181 and disturbing statistics about
179 See T.A. Sullivan, E. Warren & J.L. Westbrook, "Consumer Bankruptcy in the United
States: A Study of Alleged Abuse and of Local Legal Culture" (1997) 20 J. Consumer Pol'y 223.
180 See, for example, the United States Supreme Court decision in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234 (1934).
181 See, for example, W.C. Whitford, "The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer
Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy" (1994) 68
Am. Bankr. L.J. 397; and "Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy," supra note 176.
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the high failure rate in Chapter 13.182 In short, we need to be careful not
to oversell the blessings of voluntary plans and proposals.
Douglass Boshkoff's observation 8 3 that the British bankruptcy
system is intended to serve as a creditors' collection instrument is
partially true,184 but is it not also true of the American bankruptcy
system? Historians tell us that the ability to substitute the collective
remedy of a bankruptcy scheme for the widely divergent state collection
laws for individual debts was a key objective of nineteenth-century
creditors, in both Canada and the United States, in pressing for the
adoption of a federal bankruptcy Act.185
This brings me to the weighty complaints about the intrusiveness
and subjectivity of British-style payment orders and conditional
discharges. The subjectivity cannot be denied. Still, I question whether
the experience is as traumatic and humiliating to debtors as the critics
imply it is. Boshkoff himself expresses his admiration for the
professional skill and sensitivity with which English judges have
exercised their powers;18 6 on the whole, the available Canadian evidence
shows that Canadian bankruptcy judges, registrars, and masters in
bankruptcy have exhibited the same features in applying the pre-1997
statutory provisions. 187
The seventh rationale for maintaining the fresh start principle in
the United States obviously deserves careful attention. As a Canadian, I
am not in a position to assess the gravity of the administrative problems
likely to be triggered by the introduction of a means test in the United
States. It may be that, as in Canada under the 1997 amendments to the
182 According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 36 per cent of the
Chapter 13 cases filed between 1979 and 1988 resulted in a discharge, 49 per cent were dismissed,
and 14 per cent were converted to Chapter 7: see M. Bork & S.D. Tuck, Bankruptcy Statistical
Trends: Chapter 13 Dispositions (Washington, D.C.: Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, 1994).
183 See Boshkoff, supra note 155 at 103, 105-06.
184 Only partially because, since 1883, the courts have been obliged to balance creditors'
claims against the debtors' means, and the need for debtors to rehabilitate themselves.
185 See, for example, Coleman, supra note 1, c. 2; and Telfer, supra note 98, c. 5 II, 6 I1.
186 See Boshkoff, supra note 155 at 124.
187 Arguably, some Canadian judges' treatment of student loan discharge application reflect a
higher degree of moral censure: see note 136, supra. However, the judicial reaction only reflects a
widely shared sentiment that students -have a particular obligation to repay subsidized loans
designed to enable them to acquire valued skills and better paying jobs. The weakness of this
sentiment lies in the assumption that student loan schemes are well administered and that they
ensure that students are properly counselled before enrolling in a program. For further discussion,
see Schwartz, supra note 136.
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BA, much of the burden of applying a means test could be shifted to
trustees or other administrative agencies. The real issue, it seems to me,
is whether we believe it is reasonable to require individual debtors,
consumers, and non-consumers to contribute a portion of their future
income for a limited period towards the reduction of their debts.
Forcing the consumer credit industry to internalize its losses is a
very attractive proposition. I have made the suggestion myself
elsewhere.188 Both Canada and the United States have many consumer
credit regulations but few, if any, are designed to force credit grantors to
be more discriminating and less aggressive in selling credit. The reverse
is true. The dismantlement of usury and small loan ceilings in both
countries has encouraged creditors to increase their marketing efforts.18 9
The volume of consumer credit continues to grow, the rates are high
because of "rationed" consumers or consumer insensitivity to rates,190
and those who can afford to pay the least tend to pay the most.
Valid as these arguments are, they do not answer the troubling
question whether it is fair and efficient to lump all creditors together and
why, if we want creditors to internalize their losses, we allow them to file
proofs of claim at all. There is also the further issue of what we should
do with the wide range of non-consumer credit claims, consensual as
well as non-consensual tax claims, government sponsored student loans,
alimony and support orders, as well as private loans and other non-
commercial debts. In Canada, tax claims and student loans are a
significant factor in consumer bankruptcies.
The ninth rationale, the denial that there is evidence of
substantial abuse of debtors resorting to bankruptcy when they have the
means to pay off a substantial part of their debts, raises issues common
to Canada and the United States, but with this difference: Canadian
creditors have not had to support their allegations of consumer abuses
188 See "Canadian Perspectives," supra note 130 at 215.
189 See L.M. Ausubel, "Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy" (1997) 71
Am. Bankr. L.J. 249 at 260-61. In Canada, the statutory ceiling on interest rates on loans by banks
was repealed in 1967. The ceiling on interest rates charged by consumer loan companies under the
federal Small Loans Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. S-11, was replaced in 1981 by a criminal usury ceiling in the
federal Criminal Code: see An Act to amend the Small Loans Act and to provide for its repeal and to
amend the Criminal Code, S.C. 1981, c. 43, s. 9. On the latter development, see J.S. Ziegel, "Bill C-
44: Repeal of the Small Loans Act and Enactment of a New Usury Law" Comment (1981) 59 Can.
Bar Rev. 188.
190 As of 1 June 1998, interest rates on general credit cards in Canada varied between 8.9 per
cent and 18.9 per cent, with most of the rates being at the high end. The rates for in-house credit
cards averaged 28 per cent: see Office of Consumer Affairs, Credit Card Costs (June 1998), online:
Industry Canada <http:l/strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/caOlO57e.html> (date accessed: 17 July 1999).
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with their own industry sponsored studies because they have had the
ready ear of the federal government without them.
Still, even discounting the many anecdotal stories of abuses, both
Canadian and American studies191 show some percentages of consumers
with substantial incomes who presumably could afford to make
payments, but prefer the straight bankruptcy solution to the discipline of
the proposal or Chapter 13 route. The question we need to answer is
whether these debtors deserve a windfall and whether, on a cost-benefit
analysis, society is better off, socially and economically, giving them a
free ride than adopting (or, in Canada's case, retaining) an objectionable
income payment and conditional discharge regime.
D. My Own Position
So far as Canada is concerned, my own partiality is for a British-
style discretionary discharge system-the system that obtained before
the 1997 amendments to the BA-because it seemed to work tolerably
well. It avoided the shortcomings and complexities of the American
fresh start system without hitching the courts to the consumer credit
industry bandwagon. Consumer creditors largely abstained from filing
objections to discharges, and that was their prerogative. If they did raise
objections, the courts were in a good position to balance the social
interests of the community against the debtor's income and expenses,
and the merits of the creditors' claims. As I have previously indicated,1 92
Canadian courts implicitly and explicitly applied a priority ranking to
different types of claims in weighing any objections, and in this way the
courts were able to indicate their belief that credit grantors should do
more to police their own practices.
Canadian debtors who had special needs, or were anxious to
avoid the stigma of bankruptcy, were free of course to opt for a proposal
under Part III, Division 2, although only a small percentage did.193 As I
191 For a discussion of these findings in Canada, see Schwartz & Anderson, supra note 124 at
26, Table 6 (Panel C); for a discussion of these findings in the United States see Sullivan, Warren &
Westbrook, supra note 179 at 236-37. For the early results in the Toronto bankruptcy region under
the Superintendent's statutory standards, see note 93, supra.
192 See Part VII(E), above.
193 In 1993, the number of consumer proposals was 1,791, or 3.29 per cent of the number of
consumer bankruptcies. The number more than doubled to 4,737 proposals in 1997 and the
percentage grew to 5.55 per cent. The raw data was supplied by the Office of the Superintendent of
Bankruptcy, Ottawa; I am grateful to Vic Liu for calculating the percentages. The number of
consumer proposals has jumped since the coming into effect of the 1997 amendments, and
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explain in the next section of this article, Canadian creditors missed a
valuable opportunity to make the proposal route more attractive when
Part III, Division 2 was introduced in 1992, and when it was amended in
1997.
IX. ALTERNATIVES TO STRAIGHT BANKRUPTCY194
An insolvent Canadian consumer seeking relief from his or her
indebtedness other than through bankruptcy195 has the following
options. He or she may select a statutory consolidation of his or her
debts under Part X of the BIA, or make a proposal to his or her creditors
under Part III, Division 2.196 The critical difference between a statutory
consolidation and a proposal under Division 2 is that the former
provides for no remission of any part of the debt, whereas Division 2
clearly contemplates it, although it is not mandatory.1 97 Still another
route open to Canadian consumers is to seek the assistance of a non-
profit debt repayment and credit counselling service, such as the ones
that have been active in Ontario for more than thirty years,198 or of a
amounted to 7,064 in 1998. This change is not surprising, since both consumers and trustees now
have a strong incentive to follow the proposal route--consumers because of the pressures exerted
by the 1997 amendments, and trustees both for this reason and the fact that the amended
Bankruptcy Regulations entitle them to retain a much higher percentage of the payments made
under a proposal than was allowed under the old rules.
194 See also S.J. Ruthen, "Alternatives to Personal Bankruptcy in Canada" (Conference on
the Contemporary Challenges of Consumer Bankruptcies in a Comparative Context, Faculty of
Law, University of Toronto, 21-22 August 1998) [unpublished].
195 Recall that in Canada, a debtor who opts for a reorganizational proposal under Part III of
the mtA or for a consolidation order under Part X is not treated as a bankrupt person, though the
bankruptcy rules will apply where appropriate: see BMt, supra note 3, s. 66(1).
196 The consumer may also make a proposal under Part III, Division I of the BLA, and must do
so if his or her total indebtedness, excluding a mortgage debt on the consumer's principal residence,
exceeds $75,000: see BIA, supra note 3, s. 66.11, "consumer debtor." Until 1992, only one set of
provisions were available for both commercial and consumer proposals: see Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. B-3, ss. 50-66. What is now Part III, Division 1 was extensively revised in the 1992
amendments, and a new Division 2 was added to cater to the needs of consumers: see 1992
Amendments, supra note 3, ss. 18-31 (Division 1), 32(1) (Division 2).
1 9 7 See BiA, supra note 3, ss. 66.11, "consumer proposal," s. 2, "proposal."
198 The largest and oldest of the credit counselling agencies in Ontario is Credit Counselling
Service of Toronto, which was established in 1965. There are now 27 non-profit credit counselling
agencies in Ontario who are members of an umbrella organization, the Ontario Association of
Credit Counselling Services (OACCS). "Credit counselling" is a misnomer, since from the beginning
the agencies have been equally active in running debt management programs for the benefit of
debtors and their creditors. For example, in fiscal year 1997-1998, the OACCS opened 13,944 new
counselling cases and 4,275 new debt management files. A total of $22.5 million was distributed to
creditors under debt management plans: see Ontario Association of Credit Counselling Services,
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commercial debt adjustment service. Credit counselling agencies are
strongly supported by Canadian creditors. Undoubtedly they provide a
very useful service, but their overall impact on the Canadian consumer
insolvency scene is modest, since, apart from their counselling functions,
they only act as debt prorating agencies; they have no power to grant
debt relief themselves and do not ordinarily seek remission from any
part of their clients' debts. Their job is to obtain creditors' acceptance to
a payment plan over an agreed number of years.
Commercial debt adjustment companies surface in Canada from
time to time, but they currently have a low visibility. They appear to have
been totally eclipsed by the statutory options open to insolvent
consumers and by the successful advertising for business by trustees. The
following remarks are limited to the debt adjustment regimes under the
BIA.
Part X of the BA has its genesis in orderly payment of debts
legislation adopted in Manitoba during the Depression, and
subsequently copied in Alberta.199 The Supreme Court of Canada held
the legislation ultra vires the provinces in a 1960 decision as an
encroachment on the federal government's exclusive insolvency
jurisdiction.200 This forced the federal government to introduce
legislation of its own, and it did so in 1966 by adding Part X to the Bti.201
Part X only applies to those provinces that have elected to adopt it; only
six provinces have done so.202 The total number of consolidation orders
made in 1995 amounted to 2,078, or somewhat less than 4 per cent of the
number of personal bankruptcies declared that year.203
Part III, Division 2 was added as part of the major amendments
to the BIA in 1992 in order to give consumer insolvents a more flexible
and attractive reorganizational regime than Part X. The hope has been
only partly realized. The number of consumer proposals filed in 1995, at
2,419,204 was only 341 more than the number of Part' X orders. The
Annual Report 1998 (Toronto: Ontario Association of Credit Counselling Services, 1998).
199 See Alberta, The Orderly Payment of Debts Act, S.A. 1959, c. 61; and Manitoba, Orderly
Payment of Debts Act, S.M. 1932, c. 34.
200 See Validity of The Orderly Payment of Debts Act, 1959 (Alta.), [1960] S.C.R. 571.
2 0 1 An Act to amend the Bankruptcy Act, S.C. 1966, c. 32, s. 22.
202 For the list, see Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Annual Statistical Summary
for the 1995 Calendar Year (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1995) at 38.
203 Ibid.
204 See Craddock, supra note 1 at 1. The number has since been revised to 2,655: see T.
Craddock, "Consumer Proposals: National and Regional Statistics" in Roundtable, supra note 39, 7
at 7.
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number has since grown to 4,737 in 1997,205 or 5.35 per cent of the
number of consumer bankruptcies-still well below the almost 30 per
cent ratio of Chapter 13 plans to Chapter 7 filings in the United States.
However, the Division 2 filings may be expected to rise in light of the
1997 amendments to the BIA and the new surplus income payment
provisions in section 68.206
There appear to be many reasons for the lesser popularity of
Part III, Division 2 proposals in Canada as compared to Chapter 13 in
the United States. To begin with, a Part III, Division 2 proposal has a
much lower monetary ceiling than a Chapter 13 proposal and only covers
aggregate debts up to a maximum of $75,000, excluding debts secured by
the debtor's principal residence, or as prescribed by regulation.
207 Still
more important is the fact that a secured creditor cannot be bound by a
proposal without its consent.2 08 In practice, trustees appear to be able to
work their way around this difficulty; nevertheless, the exclusion of
secured claims compromises a debtor's bargaining position.
Another important difference is that a proposal requires creditor
consent before it can become effective. 209 On the other hand, approval
of the proposal by the court is not a precondition, as it is of a plan under
Chapter 13, unless the administrator or a creditor requests a court
hearing.210 If court review occurs, the court must refuse its approval if it
concludes that the terms of the proposal are not reasonable or fair to the
debtor or the debtor's creditors. 211 The court may also decline its
approval if the debtor has committed described offences under the
Act.212 It is well known that the American bankruptcy judge plays a
much more central role in the approval process and other aspects of a
Chapter 13 plan.213
205 See Craddock, supra note 1 at 1. This number has since been revised to 4,727: see
"Consumer Proposals: National and Regional Statistics" in Roundtable, supra note 39 at 7.
206 See note 193, supra.
207 See BIA, supra note 3, s. 66.11, "consumer debtor." See also Bankruptcy Code, supra note
33, § 109(e).
208 See BiA, supra note 3, s. 66.28(2)(b).
209 The creditors' consent is assumed if creditors, having in the aggregate at least 25 per cent
in value of the proven claims, do not require a meeting, and if a meeting is not asked for by the
official receiver: see ibid. ss. 66.14(b)(iv), 66.15(2), 66.17, 66.18.
210 Ibid. s. 66.22(1).
211 Ibid. s. 66.24(2).
212 Ibid. s. 66.24(2)(a).
213 On the judge's approval role, see Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, § 1325.
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Part III, Division 2 is also harsher than Chapter 13 in dealing
with breaches of the terms of an approved proposal. On application, the
court may annul the proposal on such grounds, as well as for other
reasons and, if an annulment order is made, the debtor is deemed to
have made an assignment in bankruptcy.214 Still more important, there is
an automatic annulment where the debtor has been in default of
monthly payments for more than three months,215 but annulment does
not result in a deemed bankruptcy.216 A Canadian judge, unlike his or
her American colleague,217 has no power to grant the debtor a discharge
from the debtor's remaining debts because of the hardship to the debtor
in being required to continue with the proposal. Even if the Canadian
debtor successfully completes the terms of the proposal, he or she still
faces the same number of non-dischargeable debts as the debtor would
face in a straight bankruptcy; unlike an American debtor,218 the
Canadian debtor does not receive even partial relief.
It is difficult to predict the impact of the 1997 amendments on
Part III, Division 2 proposals. Because of substantial improvements in
the fee structure, trustees have a much stronger incentive than before to
steer debtors towards a proposal. Debtors with surplus income may also
feel they can secure a better deal under a proposal than with the
payments they would be required to make under section 68. However,
the reverse may happen. Creditors may decline a proposal they would
have accepted before the 1997 amendments if it does not oblige the
debtor to pay as much as he or she would be required to pay under
section 68 and the Superintendent's Standards.
Given Canadian creditors' complaints that Canadian consumers
were abusing the bankruptcy system and should be encouraged to make
proposals, one might have expected the credit community to prod the
federal government into removing some of the many flaws in Part III,
Division 2 described above. That this did not happen is a telling
commentary on the absence of a consumer voice in the drafting of
Canadian insolvency legislation, as well as creditors' ambivalence in
pursuing their own self-interests.
214 See BJA,supra note 3, ss. 66.3(1), (5)(a). See also Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, § 1307(c)
(the court may convert a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 case).
215 See BJA, supra note 3, s. 66.31(1).
2 16 See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada, supra note 137, E§12.
2 1 7 See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, § 1328(b).
218 Ibid. § 1328(a). See also In re Kourtakis, supra note 170; and Warren & Westbrook, supra
note 65 at 377.
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X. THE STATUS OF REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENTS
The question of when agreements between a debtor and his or
her creditors reaffirming the debtor's obligations discharged by the
bankruptcy should be recognized, and the kind of safeguards necessary
for the debtor's protection, has long been debated in the United States.
Reaffirmation agreements are regulated by the Bankruptcy Code.219 The
topic was extensively discussed by the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission,220 which concluded that the Bankruptcy Code provisions
were inadequate.2 21 It therefore recommended additional safeguards.
Because of American experience with reaffirmation agreements,
an American observer will be surprised to learn that the topic is not even
mentioned in the BL4, and was not discussed as part of the deliberations
leading to its amendment in 1992 and 1997. In my view, this is further
evidence of the extent to which the Working Group studying consumer
bankruptcy issues was obsessed about consumer abuses and blind to
creditor abuses. In fairness to the Working Group, it must be added that
reaffirmation agreements do not enjoy a high profile in Canada, and
have attracted very little academic attention. Also, very little appears to
be known about how widely reaffirmation agreements are relied on by
Canadian creditors to undo the "mischief" caused by a debtor's
discharge from bankruptcy.222
However, it would be a mistake to conclude that reaffirmation
agreements are not used in Canada. The case law clearly shows the
contrary.223 Reaffirmation agreements are governed in Canada by
general contract principles. This means that while a debtor's bare
promise after discharge to pay a pre-bankruptcy debt will be
219 See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 33, §§ 524(c), (d).
22 0 See "A Principled Approach," supra note 177 at 498-502.
221 The evidence before the Commission showed that 42.2 per cent of Chapter 7 debtors
agreed to reaffirmations. The Commission was also concerned that reaffirmations enabled "high
end," well-advised debtors to manipulate the bankruptcy system by reaffirming selected debts, while
walking away from other, more onerous ones. The Commission proposed to address these problems
by banning reaffirmation of unsecured debts completely, and limiting reaffirmation of secured debts
to the value of the collateral: see ibid. at 499-501.
222 I have asked various trustees, and only one had had first-hand experience with a
reaffirmation agreement. The others had heard vague rumours about this or that creditor trying to
use reaffirmation agreements, but the stories were insubstantial.
223 See the annotations in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada, supra note 137, H§24 (6-
145-6-147).
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unenforceable,2 24 the promise will be enforceable if it is supported by
new consideration, such as a creditor's promise to renew a line of credit
or to make a new loan.225 The position is the same with respect to the
debtor's reaffirmation of his or her personal obligations under a secured
loan.22 6
XI. THE ROLE OF CREDIT COUNSELLING IN THE
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
This topic is discussed in detail in other articles in this
Symposium, 227 and I do not want to anticipate what the authors have to
say about it. However, the origins of the provision in the BiA introducing
counselling requirements for debtors228 are important, and warrant a
comment about the mindset of those who proposed the amendment and
of the committee of the Canadian House of Commons that accepted it.
Originally, Bill C-22 contained a provision229 requiring the
Superintendent to make counselling facilities available on an optional
basis to bankrupt consumers. A group of credit counselling agencies
224 See Heather & Son v. Webb (1876), 2 C.P.D. 1 (H.C.J.); and Trans Canada Credit Corp. v.
Wolfe (1994), 28 C.B.R. (3d) 237 (Man. Q.B.). The position is the same in England: see Law of
Insolvency, supra note 78 at 319.
2 2 5 See, for example, Jakeman v. Cook (1878), 4 Ex.D. 26 (H.C.J.).
226 See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada, supra note 137, H§24 (6-146). Difficulties
arise in Canada where the debtor remains in possession of collateral after bankruptcy, and
continues to make payments after his or her discharge without an express reaffirmation agreement.
Some Canadian courts have implied a reaffirmation or novation agreement in such circumstances:
see, for example, Seaboard Acceptance Corp. v. Moen (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 143 (B.C. C.A.),
criticized in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada, supra note 137, H§24 (6-146), and in T.M.
Buckwold, "Post-Bankruptcy Remedies of Secured Creditors: As Good as it Gets" (1999) 31 Can.
Bus. L.J. 436. The decision can probably be justified on the ground that the lessor in that case was
never notified of the debtor's bankruptcy: see J.S. Ziegel, "Post-bankruptcy Remedies of Secured
Creditors: Some Comments on Prof. Buckwold's Article" (1999) 32 Can. Bus. L.J. 142 at 142-47.
The BL4 has no provision requiring the debtor or the debtor's trustee to advise the secured creditor
of the estate's intentions with respect to collateral in the estate's possession after bankruptcy. The
assumption seems to be that the initiative rests with the secured creditor, since the secured creditor
is entitled to demand release of the collateral unless the trustee elects to redeem the property: see
BL4,supra note 3, ss. 69.3(2), 128(3).
227 See R.E. Berry & S.L.T. McGregor, "Counselling Consumer Debtors Under Canada's
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 369; and "Consumer Bankruptcy in
Comparison," supra note 6.
228 See BtA, supra note 3, s. 157.1, as am. by 1992Amendments, supra note 3, s. 58.
229 See Bill C-22, An Act to enact the Wage Claim Payment Act, to amend the Bankniptcy Act
and to amend otherActs in consequence thereof, 3d Sess., 34th Parl., 1991, s. 118.
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recommended that counselling be made mandatory and a condition of a
first-time individual bankrupt receiving an automatic discharge under
section 168.1 of the hA. The committee accepted the recommendation,
and the counselling requirement now appears in section 157.1(1) of the
BIA .230
The underlying rationale for the amendment was that, since
many bankruptcies were said to be caused by consumers' inability to
manage their budgets and to use credit wisely, some instruction on these
matters would serve a beneficial purpose.
The new provisions are controversial because they are
mandatory; because they do not distinguish between the actual grounds
of a bankruptcy such as poor budgetary skills and financial problems
precipitated by loss of a job or illness in the family; and because they
draw an invidious distinction between individual bankrupts, and officers
and directors of a corporation whose poor management skills may have
caused the bankruptcy of their corporation. Just as striking is the fact
that the House of Commons committee, during the hearings on the
provisions, never considered the possibility that the credit granting
policies of a credit grantor may have contributed to the debtor's
problems, and that the BIA should contain sanctions for irresponsible
credit granting practices.
XII. CONCLUSION
It may seem extravagant to talk about the philosophy and design
of Canadian and American bankruptcy systems, given the tremendous
pressures brought to bear by influential groups on the drafting process
and the distorting effect this has on any consistent architecture. But, at
least in the United States, the issues are vigorously debated in public,
and scholars from diverse disciplines have carefully analyzed the
opposing policies and the data said to support them.
We in Canada, with a fraction of the American population but
spread across a landmass of five thousand miles, are not so fortunate.
Serious public debate of the issues canvassed in this article has been very
modest, and Canadian scholars are only now beginning to take an
interest in insolvency problems.
230 The 1997 amendments to Part III, Division 2 of the BIA extended the counselling
provisions by requiring the administrator of a consumer proposal to provide, or provide for,
counselling for the consumer debtor in accordance with directives issued by the Superintendent: see
BLa, supra note 3, s. 66.13(2)(b).
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Our Parliamentary system has also not helped. It has meant that
once an influential lobby (in the bankruptcy area this means the
consumer credit industry or Revenue Canada) has caught the
government's ear and the relevant bill has been drafted, its adoption is
almost a foregone conclusion. Committee proceedings in the House of
Commons and the Senate are often only symbolic exercises, since few
members of Parliament or senators belonging to the government party
are in a position, or willing, to challenge cabinet decisions. There is the
further complication that most Canadian politicians find consumer
insolvency problems unappealing and unhelpful in promoting their
careers.
Subject to these important procedural caveats, it can be
confidently claimed that American consumer insolvency law is much
more pro-debtor than Canadian law. In Canada's case, the balance has
been tilted still more strongly in the creditor's favour as a result of the
1997 amendments.
The key issue dividing the American and Canadian systems, and
dividing the American system from most other bankruptcy systems, is
whether or not the debtor's future income should be made available to
pay off some of the debtor's debts, and if so, how. After examining the
many rationales supporting the American fresh start philosophy I have,
with some trepidation, expressed my preference for a judicially-oriented
conditional discharge system, but stripped of the coercive features added
by the 1997 amendments. At the same time, the difference between the
Anglo-Canadian mandatory payment systems and a voluntary incentive-
driven Chapter 13 plan strikes me as only a difference in degree and
methodology. The goals are the same in both cases.
Much of the rhetoric accompanying the debate about alleged
consumer abuses has not been supported by reliable data. This is
particularly true in Canada where accessible data about many essential
aspects of consumer bankruptcies are still missing. I have also expressed
my concurrence with those critics who complain that the role of the
consumer credit industry in contributing to the high insolvency rates has
been largely ignored.
Two other aspects of the Canadian and American consumer
insolvency systems also require further investigation. One is peculiar to
Canada. The other applies to both countries. The problem particular to
Canada involves the multiple roles of trustees in serving the consumer,
the bankruptcy court, the Superintendent, and the consumer's creditors.
The conflict has become much more acute since the 1997 amendments. I
believe it needs to be addressed.
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The other aspect involves the increasing complexity of the
consumer insolvency systems in both countries. In Canada, the
additional costs fall on the consumer's shoulders, although definitionally
he or she is already insolvent. The concept of summary administration of
small estates was supposed to address the problem but, it too, in
Canada's case, has been seriously weakened by the 1997 amendments. I
believe the concept of expeditious administration of small estates
(redefined to include debtors with low incomes) needs to be revitalized
so that the debtor's meagre resources are not frittered away on fees and
disbursements.
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